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Summary  findings
Indonesia's labor market in the 1990s is characterized by  would be a hefty 12 percent of the wage bill. The other
rising labor costs, reduced worker productivity, and  problem is that the government has greatlv limited
increasing industrial unrest. The main problem is  organized labor, viewing it as a threat to political and
generous, centrally mandated, but unenforceable worker  economic stability.
benefits. Legislation encouraging enterprise-level  This approach of mandating benefits centrally through
collective bargaining might help reduce some of the costs  legislation without empowerinig  workers to enforce
associated with worker unrest.  compliance with the legislation (or negotiate their own
Policy measures Indonesia adopted in 1986 led to a  benefits packages with employers) is beginning to strain
boom in manufacturing exports and foreign direct  industrial relations in Indonesia.
investment and put Indonesia on the path to rapid  Policymakers should consider allowing effective,
export-oriented,  labor-intensive growth. In the second  democratic plant-level worker organizations. Legislation
half of the  1980s, because of abundant cheap labor, real  to encourage collective bargaining at the enterprise level
labor costs did not rise but worker productivity did,  would enable workers and managers to negotiate
partly through improved education and training of the  outcomes that might improve worker  productivity.
workforce.  Improving  dispute  resolution  mechanisnis  and the
There are increasing signs that in the early 1990s  workers' ability to he heard in the workplace  could
Indonesia's competitiveness is being eroded by several  reduce the incidence of illegal or wildcat strikes.
factors: rising labor costs, low worker productivity, and  But more than legislative changes are needed. Changes
increasing industrial unrest.  in approaches to industrial relations, deregulation,  and
One problem is generous, centrally mandated benefits,  increased competition in product markets could make
detailed in the new social security law. The estimated  unions' roles more positive, while limiting their
cost of the government-mandated  benefits package  "negative"  role.
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i.  The policy measures adopted by Indonesia in 1986 led to a boom in
manufacturing exports and foreign direct investment and put Indonesia on the path to
rapid export-oriented, labor-intensive growth.  The export boom occurred primarily in
low-skilled, labor-intensive activities such as textile, clothing and footwear.  It was fueled,
in part, by a boom in FDI, as foreign manufacturers moved their labor-intensive activities
to Indonesia to take advantage of Indonesia's cheap and abundant labor.  This growth in
manufacturing employment in Indonesia has been accompanied by increasing attention,
both domestically and internationally, to labor market issues, especially since the early
1990s.
ii.  During the second half of the 1980s, Indonesia retained its comparative
advantage in labor-intensive industries, both by maintaining sound labor market policies as
well as through effective exchange rate management. Since it still had an abundant supply
of labor, real labor costs did not rise during the 1980s, despite a substantial increase in
employment generated through the reforms.  Worker productivity, on the other hand,
rose, partly due to the improved education and training of the workforce.  As a result, unit
labor costs in the manufacturing sector fell during the second half of the 1980s, helping
Indonesia maintain its competitiveness vis a vis its regional neighbors.
iii.  There are increasing signs that in the early 1990s, Indonesia's competitiveness is
being eroded due to a number of factors.  Firstly, there are indications that labor costs
have risen rapidly in the 1990s and that, as a result, Indonesia is losing its competitive
advantage in labor-intensive industries, despite being a labor abundant economy.  This
situation has been exacerbated by external factors, such as the opening up of the low-cost
economies of India, Vietnan  and China, to foreign trade and investment. Since Indonesia
still has a relatively abundant supply of labor, the rising labor costs appear to be largely the
result of the minimum  wage policy that the Governrnent  has adopted since 1990, rather
than the outcome of market forces.  Minimum wages have been raised substantially every
year between 1989 and 1994 and have almost tripled during this period.  The level of
minimum wages in Indonesia, at about 50 percent of the average manufacturing wage in
1991, is high by international standards.  It also appears to be high by domestic standards,
since on average it is set at about four times the poverty line.
iv.  With the passage of the JAMSOSTEK or Workers'  Social Security Law in 1992,
non-wage costs could also rise substantially  in the future, further eroding the
competitiveness of the Indonesian economy. The new law provides the following benefits
to all workers:  (i) life insurance; (ii) retirement benefits; (iii) free health care for workers
and their families; and (iv) workers' compensation. The estimated cost of this package is
a rather hefty 12 percent of the wage bill. If implemented too rapidly or rigidly, it is likely
to either raise labor costs, thus resulting in a reduction in employment, or in a substitution
of other (wage and non-wage) benefits downwards in an effort by producers to control
costs.  In either case, the majority of workers in Indonesia are unlikely to benefit from
such a package.v.  The new social security law is symbolic of the approach that the Government of
Indonesia has taken for improving the welfare of Indonesian workers.  Instead of allowing
workers to organize themselves and to negotiate the particular benefit package that they
want with their employers, the Government has taken it upon itself to provide certain
benefits to workers through legislation. As a result, current labor legislation in Indonesia
is a mixed bag of legislation protective of workers' welfare and, at the same time, controls
over organized labor.  The protective legislation is the result of the immediate post-
independence concern for workers' rights and welfare, as well as the more recent response
of Government to increasing criticism in this area.  The controls over organized labor, as
evidenced in the monolithic, Government-run trade union, SPSI, has resulted from the
Government's response to a perceived threat to political and economic stability from
organized labor. The ineffectiveness  of SPSI is reflected in the fact that unionization rates
in Indonesia are amongst the lowest in the world; these rates would probably rise if
workers had more effective unions to choose from.
vi.  This approach of mandating benefits centrally through legislation, but without
empowering workers to enforce compliance with the legislation, is beginning to strain the
industrial relations system in Indonesia. Labor unrest is increasing rapidly, as evidenced
by the more-than-tenfold increase in the number of strikes and the more-than-hundred-fold
increase in the number of strikers between 1989 and 1992. More importantly, the
economic loss from these strikes, as measured in the number of working days lost,
increased over 35-fold during this period. Most of these strikes have been in the export-
oriented manufacturing sector, and have been caused by the lack of compliance of
employers with legislation governing the minimum  wage and working conditions. Despite
protective legislation governing working conditions such as hours of work, overtime rates
etc., working conditions of industrial workers in Indonesia, especially of women, are
known to be unsatisfactory, because of poor compliance with the legislation. This is likely
to be an important factor in explaining  why the productivity of Indonesian workers is low
relative to that of workers in neighboring countries.
vii.  The situation in the labor market in Indonesia in the 1990s appears to be one of
rising labor costs, low worker productivity and increasing industrial unrest.  The main
problem is one of generous, centrally-mandated  benefits combined with the lack of means
of enforcement of these benefits. In considering future policy, it would be important to
consider that effective, democratic, plant level worker organizations, by providing "voice"
at the workplace, may be able to play a positive role and reduce some of the costs
associated with worker unrest.  Legislation encouraging collective bargaining at the
enterprise level could enable workers and managers to negotiate outcomes that might be
able to enhance workers' productivity. Improving the dispute resolution mechanism and
the ability of the workers to be heard can reduce the incidence of illegal or wildcat strikes.
What would be needed, however, would be more than legislative changes.  Careful
changes in legislation, industrial relations practices, and increased deregulation and
competition in product markets could improve the positive role that unions can play while
controlling their "negative" role.INDONESIA:  LABOR MARKET  POLICIES  AND
INTERNATIONAL  COMPETITIVENESS
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Following the introduction of reforms in 1986, Indonesia was in a position to take
advantage of its low-cost, low-skilled labor because the industries that emerged initially
were simple, labor-intensive activities. Thus,  within non-oil exports, the most spectacular
growth was in the low-skilled textiles, clothing, and footwear (TCF) sectors.  Typically,
however,  the pattern of industrialization in East Asia has evolved from simple, labor-
intensive activities towards more skill  and technology-intensive industries, propelled by
rising real wages, an increasing stock of human capital, and a more sophisticated industrial
infrastructure.  During this more mature phase of industrialization, labor market and
human resource development policies become increasingly  more important for maintaining
the competitiveness of the economy.
2.  There are preliminary indications that Indonesia may soon be approaching a phase
of tightening of the labor market, as evidenced by recent signs of real wage increases in
agriculture, manufacturing and construction . As the labor market tightens, the key issue
in the labor market will become not just the creation of jobs but the creation of better
quality jobs.  In this environment, as wages rise, the upgrading of skills and improving the
productivity of labor will become  key challenges for Indonesian policymakers.
Furthermore, putting in place an industrial relations system that can deal with the more
complex needs of a class of better educated and more vocal labor force will also become a
high priority.  A number of recent surveys of foreign and local investors indicate that
investors are not only interested in the cost and quality of labor, but also in an
environment that promotes peaceful labor relations.  This paper examines key aspects of
the labor market in Indonesia with a view to determining whether current labor market
policies and institutions give Indonesia a comparative edge over its neighbors in the
region. With this in mind, the paper looks at three aspects of the labor market:
*  the cost of labor;
*  the quality of labor; and
*  the industrial relations system.
3.  The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  Section II examines briefly the nature
of the export boom and the FDI boom that has occurred in Indonesia since the mid-l 980s.
Section III examines their impact on the labor market.  Section IV provides a comparative
perspective on labor costs and productivity in Indonesia and in some of its neighbors.
Section V examines policies that might affect the cost of labor, in particular, minimum2
wage and social insurance policies.  Section VI focuses on policies affecting the quality of
labor, in particular, policies for human resource development and working conditions.
Finally, Section VII  reviews the role of the industrial relations system in affecting labor
peace.
II.  TE  POST-1986 EXPORT BOOM AND FDI BOOM
4.  In response to the severe decline in oil prices in 1986, Indonesia initiated a wide-
ranging program of economic reform aimed at stabilization and structural adjustment of
the economy. This program had three dimensions: an increasingly strict fiscal policy;
changes in factor prices towards their market levels; and deregulation and institutional
reform. The economy responded handsomely to this package of reforms: real GDP grew
at an annual average rate of about 7 percent between 1987 and 1993; the current account
deficit was cut from 8 percent of GNP in the early 1980s to 3 percent  by 1993; the
inflation rate was held to below 10 percent between 1986 and 1992, and fell to 5 percent
in 1992; and the debt service ratio declined from 40 percent in 1986 to 34 percent in 1993.
Non-oil exports grew particularly fast and by 1992/93 were estimated to account for
almost 70 percent of total exports, compared with about 20 percent a decade earlier.
5.  The policy measures adopted in 1986, especially  the devaluation and trade
liberalization measures, finally put Indonesia on the path to rapid export-oriented, labor-
intensive growth that its neighbors had adopted much earlier. This pattern of growth,
characterized as the "East Asian model",  had been adopted at least two decades earlier by
the NIEs and at least a decade earlier by Indonesia's ASEAN neighbors' (Hill, 1992a).
However, Indonesia had departed from this pattern in the 1970s, partly because of its
much stronger natural resource endowment, the exploitation of which had required large
complementary inputs of capital, and partly because of the "Dutch Disease" effects of the
oil boom of the 1970s. Thus, during the 1970s, Indonesia's manufactured exports were
negligible, never exceeding $500 million  and always less than 3 percent of total
merchandise exports.  It was only after the mid-1980s that Indonesia began to exploit its
strong potential comparative advantage in labor-intensive  manufactures. In this, Indonesia
was aided by a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) that occurred in
response to the change in its investment climate.
6.  The pattern of growth that emerged since the mid-1980s has been labor-friendly.
Employment increased, especially paid employment which grew by 4.6 percent per annum
between 1986-1990; in contrast, in the four year period prior to that (1982-86), paid
employment fell slightly (at an annual average rate of 0.02 per cent), resulting in a net loss
of 1.5 million paid jobs over the four years.  During the second half of the 1980s,
The  four  NIEs  or the Newly  Industnalizing  Economies  consist  of Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Korea,  and Taiwan,
China. The six countries  in the ASEAN  or the Association  of South East  Asian Nations  are: Thailand,
Philippines,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Brunci  and Singapore.3
employment in manufacturing grew especially  rapidly, by 8.5 percent per annum. While,
due to the availability  of abundant unskilled labor in Indonesia, real wages for unskilled
labor have not shown any noticeable increases until recently, average real labor earnings
have increased as labor entered more productive and higher-paying  jobs both across and
within broad sectors.  This increase in earnings, combined with the increased participation
of women in the labor force, has been one of the major factors contributing to a
substantial reduction in poverty in Indonesia.
111  The Export Boom
7.  Following the initiation of policy reform in the mid-1980s, there has been a boom
in the export of labor-intensive manufactures in Indonesia.
Table 1: Growth of Manufactured Exports in Indonesia, 1980-1991
1980  1985  1991  Increase  Increase
per annum  per annum
1980-85  1985-91
($ million)
Total Exports of All  501  2,044  11,816  32%  34%
Manufactures
Labor Intensive  297  807  6,814  22%  43%
Manufactures
Resource Intensive  119  992  3,488  53%  23%
Manufactures
Capital Intensive  85  245  1,514  24%  35%
Manufactures
Percentages
Manufactures as a %  of  2  11  41  na  na
Total Exports
Labor Intensive as a  %  59  39  58  na  na
of  all Manufactures
Resource Intensive as a  24  49  30  na  na
% of all Manufactures
Capital Intensive as a %  17  12  13  na  na
of all Manufactures
Source: Hill (1992b).4
8.  As Table I indicates, total exports of all manufactures grew at roughly the same
rate (32%-34%) during the pre-reform period (1980-85) and the post-reform period
(1985-1991).  However, the composition of the manufactured exports changed
dramatically between the two periods: the rate of growth of labor-intensive exports
doubled while that of resource-intensive exports halved. Thus, the pattem of exports that
emerged in the post-reform period was strongly consistent with Indonesia's comparative
advantage in labor-intensive activities. During the second half of the 1980s, labor-
intensive manufactures have increased over eight-fold, from just over $800 million in 1985
to about $7 billion in 1991. As a result, the share of labor-intensive manufactures in the
exports of all manufactures has risen from 39 percent in 1985 to 58 percent in 1991 (see
Table 1).
Table 2: Major Labor-Intensive Manufactured Exports in Indonesia, 1980-1991
($ million)
1980  1985  1991  Increase  Increase
per annum  per annum
1980-85  1985-91
Labor Intensive  297  807  6,814  22%  43%
Manufactures
--of which
Clothing  98  339  2,265  28%  37%
Fabrics  43  227  1,552  39%  38%
Yarn  3  13  204  34%  58%
Footwear  1  8  994  52%  123%
Electronics  97  81  403  -4%  31%
Furniture  3  7  385  18%  95%
Toys & Sporting  na  na  142  na  na
Goods
Glass & Products  3  8  91  22%  50%
Oils & Perfumes  21  23  94  2%  26%
Source: Hill (1992b).S
9.  Table 2 above shows that the rate of growth of exports of most labor-intensive
manufactures increased substantially  in the post-reform period.  The most spectacular
growth in exports was recorded in two items: footwear, which grew at 123 percent per
annum in the second half of the 1980s, and fumiture, which grew at 95 per cent per
annum. The growth of footwear exports, in particular, has been spectacular, rising from
only $8 million in 1985 to almost $1 billion in 1991, and quadrupling between 1989 and
1991.  The Table also shows that despite the rapid growth in a number of items, the bulk
(almost three-fourths) of labor-intensive exports in 1991 still consisted of a small number
of commodities, in particular textiles, clothing and footwear.  Textile and clothing exports
doubled between 1989 and 1991, an astonishing performance in view of  declining OECD
growth rates and tightening MFA quotas.  They have now become Indonesia's major
manufactured export, accounting for one-third of the total, and easily surpassing plywood,
which was the dominant export item of the 1980s. Table 2 also indicates that performance
in some of the other more skill-intensive  sectors, such as electronics, has not been as
encouraging as in the low-skilled ones.
11.2 The FDI Boom
10.  Since 1987, there has been a dramatic increase in both domestic and foreign
investment in Indonesia, most of it in export-oriented activities. This surge in investment
has occurred in response to the improvements in a previously unattractive investment
climate and in the country's trade regime.  Most striking has been the rise in investment in
Indonesia by Asia's four NEs:  Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, China (Hill,
1990). For decades, big companies in the industrialized West, and more recently, Japan,
had been moving their manufacturing operations to lower-wage areas such as  the four
NIEs.  But as wages have risen in these NIEs, and these countries have begun to lose their
comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing, not only has investment from the
Western countries begun to move to other lower cost countries, such as Indonesia, but
these NIEs have also started to move their own operations overseas to such countries.
11.  The Government of Indonesia has taken several steps to encourage foreign
entrepreneurs, especially from Japan and the Asian NIEs, to invest in Indonesia.  In
recognition of the fact that many potential investors from these countries are small, labor-
intensive firms seeking to relocate their operations because of rising costs in their own
countries, the Indonesian Government in May 1989 reduced the minimum amount of
foreign investment required from $1 million  to $250,000.  This reduction has contributed
to an increased flow of direct investment by Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese small- and
medium-scale industries (Wie, 1991).
12.  Table 3 illustrates the dramatic rise in the number and total amount of approved
foreign direct investment (FDI) projects since 1986. It shows that the total amount of FDI
approved per annum rose by over ten-fold between 1986 and 1992. The number of
projects approved per annum also increased dramatically, from 93 in 1986 to 305 in 1992.
The Table also shows that Asian countries are the predominant investors in Indonesia, and
furthermore, that their predominance has grown during the second half of the 1980s.6
Thus, in 1987, Asian countries accounted for only 30 percent of all projects approved in
Indonesia, but by 1992, their share had increased to 65 percent.  In 1992, the NIEs were
the dominant  foreign investors in Indonesia, accounting for almost 44 percent of all
projects, with Japan accounting for another 16 percent.
Table 3: Approved Foreign Investment in Indonesia, 1986-1992
1986  1987  1988  1990  1992
Total Amount of  848  1,481  4,409  8,750  10,313
FDI approved ($m)
Number of Projects  93  130  145  432  305
Percentage Asian  na  30%  63%  78%  65%
--of which
--Japan  na  14%  17%  18%  16%
--NEEs  na  15%  45%  58%  44%
Source: Wie (1991); and Republic of Indonesia (1994c).
13.  The availability  of cheap and abundant labor in Indonesia is obviously an important
motivating factor for foreign investors, especially the NEEs,  to invest in Indonesia. Using
indices of value added per worker in various industries as a measure of labor intensity,
Wie (1991) found that the bulk of the FDI of the NIEs was concentrated in labor intensive
activities. For example, data from 1990 show that 99 of the 102 approved Korean and 94
of the 97 approved Taiwanese manufacturing projects were located in labor intensive
industries. Furthermore, 64 percent of Korean  projects and 43 percent of Taiwanese
projects were located in highly labor intensive industries. Since cheap labor is one of the
major attractions for foreign investors in Indonesia, it is critical that Indonesia adopt
policies that help it retain its competitive edge in labor-intensive  industries, at least over
the next decade or so, when it can start to make the transition to a more high-skilled
economy.7
HI.  IMPACT ON THE LABOR MARKET
M1A Impact on Employment
14.  The impact  of the reform  program  on total employment  is difficult  to judge. For
Indonesia,  the usual  labor  force  measures  of employment  and unemployment  are not very
illuminating.  Total employment  in Indonesia  is largely  supply-determined,  growing  at
around the same  annual  rate as the labor  force (3.5 percent during  the 1980s).  Thus,
inspection  of the total employment  series  tells us nothing  about  what is happening  to labor
demand  in Indonesia. The unemployment  rate is also  not a good indicator  of the labor
market situation:  it has remained  more or less  constant  through  the 1980s,  never rising
above 3 percent during  the 1982-90  period.  What is more indicative  of changes  in the
Indonesian  economy's  demand  for labor  is changes  in wage employment.  As Table  4
indicates,  wage employment  grew at an average  rate of 4.5 percent per annum  over  the
1986-90  period--a  sure sign  of an improvement  in the economy's  demand  for labor.  The
Table  also shows  the very fast growth  of wage  employment  in agriculture  and
manufacturing  and the even  faster  growth  in trade and  restaurants,  partly  derived  from the
growth in other sectors,  and partly  reflecting  the rapid  expansion  of international  tourism.
Table 4: Wage  Employment by Sector in Indonesia, 1986-1990
~~~~~~~~('000)  ('000)  Rate of Growth pa
Forestry, etc.
Manufacturing  3,105  4,296  8.5%
Trade & Restaurants  789  1,169  10.3%
Public Services  7,283  7,300  0.1%
Other  2,872  3,435  4.6%
Total  17,580  21,076  4.6%
Source:  Godfrey  (1993) based  on Labor  Force Sui-veys  by BPS.
15.  The post-1986  boom  clearly  had a major effect  on employment  creation  in
Indonesia,  and both male  and female  workers  benefited  from  this boom, though  the
employment  gains  were larger for female  workers. Table 5 reveals  that the number  of
male employees  in the manufacturing  sector rose by 14 percent  between 1982-86;  during
the next  four years,  this number  rose by a further  32 percent. The rate ofjob creation  for8
female workers in the manufacturing sector also increased substantially in the post-reform
period:  during 1982-86, the number of manufacturing sector jobs for women increased by
13 percent; whereas during the following four years, the number of jobs increased by a
staggering 53 percent.  As a result, while the share of female workers in the manufacturing
workforce remained unchanged at 32 percent between 1982-86, during the next four years
it grew to 35%.
Table 5: Numbers Employed and Real Earnings in Manufacturing in Indonesia,
1982-1990
1982  1986  1990  Total Increase  Total Increase
('000)  ('000)  ('000)  1982-86  1986-90
Male
No. of Wage  1,852  2,113  2,779  14%  32%
Employees
Real Earnings  100  102  112  2%  10%
Index
Female
No. of Wage  879  992  1,517  13%  53%
Employees
RealEarnings  100  114  124  14%  9%
Index
Source: Godfrey (1993) based on Labor Force Surveys by BPS.
111.2  Impact on Earnings
16.  Table 5 also shows that between 1982-1990, female workers in the manufacturing
sector gained substantially  more than their male counterparts in terms of real earnings:
while male earnings grew by 12 percent over the entire period, female earnings grew by
twice as much. Furthermore, the earnings for male workers in the manufacturing sector
have remained more or less constant in real terms between 1982-1989, and have only
experienced an increase between 1989 and 1990. Female employees in the manufacturing
sector, in contrast, experienced a growth in their real incomes in both the pre- and post-
reform period, though again, a substantial part of their growth in earnings also occurred in
the last year.
17.  This trend is confirmed when we examine  wage data instead of earnings data.
Thus, the growth in employment between 1986 and 1989 in the manufacturing sector was
achieved without a substantial increase in the real wage for either sex, which is consistent
with the unlimited-labor-supply  model.  It is only in 1990 that there is some preliminary
evidence of an increase in real wages in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia. Evidence9
indicates that real wages in agriculture also appear to have tumed sharply upwards in
1992, while a similar steep upturn in construction wages in some cities seems to have
started a year earlier (Godfrey, 1993). Given the lag with which data on wages are
available in Indonesia, it is still too early to judge whether these trends are evidence of  a
tightening of the labor market. 2 Some observers argue that Indonesia is still a labor
abundant economy and that it has not yet approached the rising-real-wage  turning point
which signals a sustained tightening of the labor market (Manning, 1993a, 1994).  They
argue that while the export boom in the manufacturing sector has contributed somewhat
to labor's welfare since the mid-1980s, it has not been large enough or sustained enough
to absorb the large availability  of rural labor in Indonesia.
18.  Despite the rapid growth in employment in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia
since the mid-i 980s, it needs to be kept in mind that the sector still employs a relatively
small share of the country's workforce.  Thus, in 1990, the manufacturing sector in
Indonesia accounted for only 10 percent of total employment, whereas the comparable
share was 20 percent in Malaysia, and 17 percent in China, which has a significantly  lower
income than Indonesia. One reason for the smaller share of manufacturing sector
employment in Indonesia as compared with other countries is the relatively recent growth
of this sector in Indonesia. Another contributory factor, however, is the still incomplete
process of internal and external deregulation of some of the sectors, such as food
processing, that have strong backward linkages to labor-intensive activities in agriculture.
Since 1991, progress in reducing average tariff protection and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
has slowed in Indonesia (World Bank, 1994c). Average tariffs remain high in Indonesia
when compared with Indonesia's neighbors. For example, Indonesia's 20 percent average
tariff compares with 14 percent in Malaysia (World Bank, 1995).  In manufacturing, the
average effective rate of protection (ERP) is estimated at 23 percent in 1994, with a wide
dispersion within the sector.  The ERP ranges from 9 percent in the export-oriented TCF
sectors to 85 percent in the engineering sector.  The food processing sector is another
sector with high ERPs: excluding the polished rice subsector, ERP in the food, beverages,
and tobacco sector is estimated at 65 percent.  This high ERP in food processing is likely
to be inhibiting  potential exports and hence, potential growth of employment in labor-
intensive sectors such as agriculture with which it has strong backward linkages. In
contrast to the situation in Indonesia where the agro-business sector plays a marginal role
in industrial output and employment, in India, for example, this sector has become the
fastest growing sector of the economy, accounting for 52 percent of total industrial
investment, 19 percent of  the industrial labor force, and 13.5 percent of industrial output. 3
Clearly, further internal and external deregulation in Indonesia is required for the
sustained growth of labor-intensive, manufacturing export industries over the next decade.
This is critical for the general improvement in labor incomes in Indonesia.
2Wage  statistics  in Indonesia  suffer  from a number  of significant  shortcomings  (Godfrey,  1991),  especially  in the
manufacturing  sector  where they  are available  only  with a three-four  year lag.
3See  Oxford  Analytica  Asia Pacific  Daily  Brief, January  23, 1995.10
IV.  COMPARATIVE  LABOR COSTS  AND PRODUCTIVITY
19.  This section provides a comparative perspective on trends in labor costs and labor
productivity in the four large ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand) with a view to determining whether Indonesia is maintaining its competitive
advantage in the production of labor-intensive commodities vis a vis its neighbors in
ASEAN.  For purposes of comparison, Figure 1 depicts trends in the unit labor costs
(ULCs) in the manufacturing sector in the four countries denominated in a common
currency (US dollars). 4 The Figure shows that at least until 1991 (the most recent year
for which we have information on Indonesian wages) Indonesia was indeed maintaining its
competitiveness vis a vis its neighbors as far as labor costs were concerned.  During 1985-
91,  Indonesia's ULCs in the manufacturing sector declined by over 30 percent, whereas in
the other three countries (Malaysia,  Philippines and Thailand), ULCs have either increased
or remained constant over this period.  Of the three comparator countries, Malaysia has
fared the best: during 1985-91, its ULCs were almost constant, though since then they
have shown a moderate upward trend.  The country that has fared the worst is the
Philippines, where ULCs have risen throughout the period and have more than doubled
between 1985 and 1992. The performance of labor costs in Thailand lies between that of
Malaysia and the Philippines:  ULCs in Thailand rose steeply between 1985 and 1987, and
while their growth has moderated somewhat since then, it has nevertheless led to a 75
percent in ULCs over the period. 5
Figure 1: Comparative Trends in ULCs (USS)
210
210  -..........-  ::00  ::00 00;  ;00000  ;03  000  0 0  in on si
3..170  - . .:i--0:l  . ......  ... ..  ....  :  Z  . -;;  ; ; ;t-  :  i
15000l0  l i00--00t  Malaysia
X  110  0  000i  0-  0  i  ]  ~~~~~Thailand
c  SS:Er:::..EEi.i.................  ......  ....  f  :E.E.-.E  ..:.E.E:.  E  ..-.
70 .. ....  .- ;  .- 0  ...  ........-- ?T  E:EEg  :  ,  =  ;  --- g:  - +;ggt  g
170-  ..  ...
Year
4 Unit labor  costs measure  the cost of labor  per unit of output. They  are a better  measure of comparative  labor  costs
than wage rates since  they take into  account  differences  in labor  productivity.
5 The average  nominal  manufacturing  wage in 1992  in Indonesia  was Sl,l  0; in Malaysia  it was S5,808;  in the
Philippines  it was $1,551;  and in Thailand  it was $3,38511
20.  Even though wage data for Indonesia are unavailable beyond 1991, there are
reasons to believe that the performance of the labor market in Indonesia has deteriorated
since 1991. As discussed in Section V below, by 1991, legislated minimum  wages had
become as high as 50 percent of average wages in manufacturing; between 1991 and
1993, minimum  wages have been raised further by another 31 percent (see Table 7 below).
Since the majority of workers in the manufacturing sector are paid at rates quite close to
the minimum  wage, these hikes are likely to have an impact on the average wage in the
manufacturing sector, especially in the formal and large-scale part of this sector.
Assuming that in 1992 and 1993 the average wages in the manufacturing sector continued
to be about twice the level of minimum  wages, we can predict the average manufacturing
wages for 1992 and 1993, as has been done and plotted using the dashed lines for
Indonesia in Figure 1 above. The Figure shows a  steep rise in Indonesia's llLC between
1992-93, causing some concern about the rapid erosion in its competitiveness.
21.  For the purposes of comparing labor costs across countries it is necessary to
measure costs in some common currency, as is done above. However, this makes it
difficult to distinguish  the role played by labor market policies from the role of other
macroeconomic policies, in particular, exchange rate policies, in affecting the international
competitiveness of these economies. To separate the influence of the two sets of policies,
we need to look separately at the exchange rate and labor market outcomes during this
period.  During 1985-92, Indonesia aggressively managed its exchange rate in order to
maintain its international competitiveness. As Table 6 indicates, during this period,
Indonesia's  real exchange rate depreciated (by about 15 percent), whereas that of the
other three large ASEAN countries appreciated (by between 17-46 percent).  Thus, part
of the reason why Indonesia maintained an edge over its neighbors in terms of
competitive labor costs is due to the judicious management of its exchange rate.
Table 6: Comparative Changes in Inflation, Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
1985-1992
Country  Inflation Index in  Nominal Exchange  Change in Real
1992  Rate Index in 1992  Exchange Rate,
(1985=100)  (1985=100)  1985-1992
Indonesia  168  183  -15%
Malaysia  120  103  17%
Philippines  187  141  46%
Thailand  133  93  40%
Source: IMF.12
22.  If we look at the domestic  labor market  situation  in the manufacturing  sector in the
four countries  (depicted  in Figures  2-5), we find again  that Indonesia  has had the best
outcome,  at least  until  very recently  (Figure  2).6  As  discussed  earlier,  real  labor costs in
the manufacturing  sector  in Indonesia  remained  more or less  constant during 1985-1991,
reflecting  the abundant  supply  of unskilled  labor  in Indonesia.  Productivity,  nevertheless,
rose by almost  25 percent during  this period,  as a result of which  real ULCs  in Indonesia
fell by about 25 percent  during  this period. None of the three comparator  countries
matches  Indonesia's  labor  market  performance  in this  respect. In Malaysia,  while  labor
productivity  grew at about  twice the rate of growth  in Indonesia,  real  labor costs kept
pace  with the growth in productivity  (Figure  3); as a result,  real ULCs  in Malaysia
remained  almost  unchanged  over the whole  period. The Philippines  had the worst labor
market outcome  over the period:  significant  increases  in real  labor costs (by 52 percent)
were accompanied  by declining  productivity,  resulting  in large  increases  in real ULCs (by
65 percent)  during  this period  (Figure  4).  The performance  of the labor  market  in
Thailand  lies  between  that of Malaysia  and the Philippines:  between 1985  and 1987,  the
labor market  situation  deteriorated  rapidly  as real labor  costs exploded  while  productivity
growth stagnated  (Figure  5); since  then, however,  productivity  growth has outstripped  the
growth  in real labor  costs so that ULCs have  declined. As a result, in contrast  to the
exploding  ULCs  in the Philippines,  in Thailand  ULCs have  grown by only about 17
percent  during  this period.
6 In Figure  2, data for  manufacturing  wages  in Indonesia  in 1992  and 1993  are predicted  as before.13
Figure 2: Indonesia's Manufacturing ULC (Rp)
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Figure 4: Philippines' Manufacturing ULC (Pesos)
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23.  The analysis  above clearly  indicates  that until 1991,  Indonesia  performed  better
than its neighbors  in maintaining  its competitive  advantage  in labor-intensive  industries,
both because  of a better performance  of the Indonesian  labor  market,  as well as through
effective  exchange  rate management.  What is not clear,  however,  is whether  Indonesia
has maintained  its competitive  edge  over its neighbors  since 1991. While  recent  data on
manufacturing  wages  in Indonesia  are unavailable,  our projections  indicate  that it is likely
that rising  labor  costs have  begun  to erode some  of Indonesia's  competitiveness.  Table  7
presents  data on costs per worker,  value added  per worker, and unit labor  costs in the
manufacturing  sectors of the four large ASEAN  countries  in 1992. It reveals  that while
Indonesia  had the lowest  absolute  labor costs of the four countries,  when productivity
differences  were taken into account,  its ULCs  were higher  than  those of the Philippines  or
of Thailand.  Recent data on export growth  in Indonesia  indicates  a slowing  down in some
of the more labor-intensive  sectors,  such  as TCF, indicating  perhaps  that Indonesia  is
already  becoming  internationally  uncompetitive  in such activities. The reasons for this
slow-down  need  to be examined  more  fully  because  Indonesia  can ill afford  to adopt
policies  that price one of its most abundant  resources,  unskilled  labor, out of employment.
In the next section,  we examine  the effect  of some  Government  policies  on wage and non-
wage labor costs in Indonesia.
Table 7: Comparative Labor Costs and Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector,
1992
Country  Cost per Worker  Value Added per  Unit Labor Costs
Worker
Indonesia  $1,110  $1,556  0.71
Malaysia  $5,808  $7,280  0.80
Philippines  $1,551  $2,714  0.57
Thailand  $3,385  $5,366  0.6316
V.  POLICIES  AFFECTING  THE COST OF LABOR
V.1  Wage Compensation
24.  Minimum Wage Policy in Indonesia  - The Indonesian Government responded
to the greater international scrutiny of labor standards in the late 1980s by focusing
particularly on minimum  wages.  In 1989, it introduced legislation to regularize the
existing haphazard system of minimum  wages that had been introduced in most regions
from the early 1970s.7 The minimum  wage in Indonesia refers to the lowest basic wage
plus permanent allowances, where the basic wage must be at least 75 percent of the
minimum  wage.  Minimum  wages are to be fixed based on considerations of "minimum
physical need"(KPM), cost of living, and labor market conditions.  The minimum wage is
set separately by region and by sector.  The 1989 regulation states that minimum wages
must be reviewed at least every two years.  A 1990 Decree requires that minimum wages
be adjusted once a year in proportion to the CPI.
25.  A recent study of labor market legislation in six APEC countries compared key
features of the minimum  wage legislation in Indonesia with those in five other countries:
Malaysia, Korea, Mexico, Chile, and the United States (World Bank, 1994a). The study
found that minimum  wage provisions in Indonesia are at least as generous as in any of the
other five countries, even though the comparator countries all have significantly higher
levels of income than Indonesia. 8 Malaysia, for example, has no legislated minimum  wage
at all.  The other four comparator countries have legislated minimum  wages but they either
have more exclusions in coverage than Indonesia, and/or permit certain non-wage benefits
to be counted towards the minimum  wage. 9 Thus, for example, while the Indonesian
minimum  wage applies to all industrial workers, irrespective of the size of the workplace
or the status of the employee (including probationers, trainees and apprentices), the US
wage is applicable only to large businesses (with annual gross volume of sales/business of
at least $500,000), and only to certain types of employees (excluding students, trainees, or
handicapped workers, who are the most likely to be discriminated against by employers as
a result of the minimum  wages because of their lower productivity). Furthermore, unlike
the Indonesian law, the US law also permits employers to include the cost of boarding and
lodging for their employees as part of the minimum  wage.
26.  Minimum wages in Indonesia have grown rapidly since the legislation was
introduced in 1989 and the new procedures for calculating  the wage rates were put into
place.  The Government's long term objective was to bring the minimum  wage figure,
which typically lagged the mninimum  physical needs (KPM) figure, in line with the KPM
figure in all regions by April 1994. Towards this end, minimum wages have been raised
7 Minimum wages are currently regulated through the Ministry of Manpower Regulation No. PER-05/MEN/1 989
(amended in 1989 and 1990).
s The 1992 per capita incomes of the six countries being compared were: Indonesia (S670); Chile ($2,730); Malaysia
($2,790); Mexico ($3,470); Korea ($6,790); and the United States ($23,240).
9 Details of the comparison are contained in Annex Table Al.17
substantially  every year between 1989 and 1994 and have almost tripled during this
period.  As a result, in most regions they are now equal (or almost equal) to the KPM and
in some regions they even surpass it. For example, effective January 1, 1994, the daily
minimum wage for the greater Jakarta region was raised to Rp 3,800 per day, which is just
over the basic needs figure for a single worker in that region. In some of the other
regions, the rate is even higher: in the industrial zone of Batam Island, the daily minimum
wage has been raised to Rp 6,750 and in Irian Jaya to Rp 4,500.  From April 1, 1995,
minimum  wages were raised further nationwide by approximately 10 percent.
27.  Minimum Wages and Labor Costs - What is the likely impact of these rising
minimum  wages on the cost of labor in Indonesia? The answer to this question depends in
a large part on the degree to which these minimum  wages are complied with and the
extent to which they are binding. Compliance with minimum  wage regulations in any
developing country is likely to be low, given that enforcement is expensive and, typically,
limited resources are spent on it.  In a country such as Indonesia, where a large share of
employment is in the informal sector, enforcement is particularly difficult. Thus, any
impact of the legislation in Indonesia is likely to be felt predominantly in the formal sector.
Within the formal sector, compliance is likely to be higher in sectors that are dominated by
more visible investors, such as foreign investors, multinationals (who often follow their
own labor standards) or large domestic conglomerates, for whom the risks associated with
non-compliance are higher. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, a lot of such investors are
in the export-oriented, labor-intensive sectors such as textile, clothing and footwear
(TCF).  In sectors that are dominated by smaller, less visible firms, compliance is likely to
be lower, especially given that Indonesia lacks independent and effective unions who could
potentially have an important role in enforcing minimum  wages.
Table 8: Comparison of Average Manufacturing Wage With Legal Minimum Wage
in Indonesia,  1985-1994
Year  Average Daily Wage  Legislated  Ratio of Minimum
in Manufacturing  Minimum Daily  to Average Wage
(Rp)  Wage (Rp)  (percent)
1985  2,469  817  33%
1986  2,243  879  36%
1987  2,647  987  37%
1988  2,800  1,119  40%
1989  3,035  1,134  37%
1990  3,256  1,481  46%
1991  3,606  1,820  50%
1992  na  2,033  na
1993  na  2,393  na
1994  na  3,134  na
Source:  Republic of Indonesia, Department of Manpower.18
28.  To examine the issue of whether the minimum  wages in Indonesia are likely to be
binding, Table 8 above presents data on the average labor costs in manufacturing and the
legislated minimum  wage (on average) between 1985-1991. It shows that, over the years,
as the minimum  wage has been raised, it has become closer and closer to the average wage
in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the minimum  wage as a proportion of the average
manufacturing wage has risen from 33 percent in 1985 to just over 50 percent in 1991.
Furthermore, this ratio is likely to be even higher in 1994, given that the minimum wage
has increased by a further 72 percent between 1991 and 1994.  As discussed below, such
a high level of minimum  wage relative to the average wage seems to indicate that the
minimum  wage may well be binding in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia.
29.  The ratio of minimum  to average wages in manufacturing in Indonesia is high by
international standards.  The comparative study of labor market legislation in the six
APEC countries had found that the four comparator countries which had legislated
minimum  wages appeared to have set their minimum  wages at lower levels relative to the
average manufacturing wages (see Table 9).  In contrast to the 50 percent ratio in
Indonesia in 1991, in the comparator countries the ratio ranged from 13 percent in Mexico
in 1990 to 38 percent in the United States in 1991. These estimates suggest that the
minimum wage may be more binding in Indonesia than it is in the other four countries in
the sample.
Table 9: Comparison of Minimum Wage with Average Manufacturing Wage
in Six APEC Countries
Country  Ratio of  Legislated Minimum Wage
to Average Manufacturing Wage
Indonesia  0.5




United States  0.38
Source: World Bank (1994a).  For details see Annex Table Al.
30.  Other evidence indicates that, at least in the large and formal industrial sector
where compliance with the minimum  wage regulations is likely to be higher, minimum
wages in Indonesia are indeed binding and that their high levels have begun to erode the
competitiveness of the more labor-intensive industries, such as TCF.  For example,
newspaper reports indicate that South Korean textile entrepreneurs operating in Indonesia
have threatened to relocate their factories outside Indonesia if the Government raises the
minimum  wage further in April 1995, as has been announced (The Indonesia Times,
October 21, 1994).  Furthermore, the Indonesian Textile Association has indicated that if19
minimum  wages are raised further, "there will be some textile factories going out of
business" (The Jakarta Post, November 12, 1994). There are also growing signs that with
the opening up of the low cost economies of China, Vietnam and India to foreign trade
and investment, Indonesia is coming under increasing pressure from foreign investors to
contain its labor costs in order to maintain its competitiveness. In China and Vietnam, for
example, hourly labor costs in the textile industry (at 0.36 cents and 0.37 cents,
respectively) are only about 70 percent of those in Indonesia (0.49 cents) (Far Eastem
Economic Review, July 28, 1994).
31.  Are minimum  wages too high in Indonesia? Since in Indonesia, minimum  wages
are set with the objective of reducing poverty by guaranteeing workers some kind of a
living wage, one way to answer this question is to see how the minimum  wage level is
related to some measure of basic needs. In Indonesia, the level of minimum  wages is
explicitly related to the "minimum  physical needs" (KPM) figures which are calculated
specifically  for this purpose.  However, as Table 10 indicates, the regional KPM figures
bear no relationship to the regional poverty lines, which are also calculated on the basis of
some alternative measure of minimum  physical needs.  In fact, the KPM figures are higher
than the poverty line figures by a factor ranging from 3.5 times in Jakarta to 5:3 times in
East Nusa Tenggara.  The reasons why the KPM figures are so much higher than the
poverty line figures need to be investigated carefully. If the poverty line figures are
indeed representative of minimum  needs in Indonesia, then it could be argued that the
minimum wage levels are indeed too high.  In any case, since poverty in Indonesia is
largely a rural and informal sector phenomenon, and minimum  wages are likely to be
complied with only in the formal, industrial sector, they are unlikely to be an effective tool
for reducing poverty.20
Table 10: Regional Poverty Lines and Minimum Physical Needs (KPM) Figures in
Indonesia,  1990
Poverty Line  KPM for a  Ratio of  KPM
(Rp/month)  Single Worker  to Poverty Line
(Rp/month)
SUMATRA  16,792  na  na
Aceh  16,131  69,446  4.3
North Sumatra  16,160  75,004  4.6
West Sumatra  16,908  62,681  3.7
Riau  20,541  97,357  4.7
South Sumatra  16,219  77,124  4.8
Lampung  15,995  75,027  4.7
Other Sumatra /a  18,195  67,603  3.7
JAVA AND BALI  16,475  na  na
Jakarta  22,000  76,230  3.5
West Java  17,426  68,889  4.0
Central Java  14,774  70,578  4.8
Yogyakarta  15,053  61,250  4.1
East Java  15,703  58,158  3.7
Bali  16,303  78,753  4.8
KALIMANTAN  18,703  na  na
West Kalimantan  20,010  84,890  4.2
South Kalimantan  16,343  76,950  4.7
Other Kalimantan /b  19,289  99,068  5.1
SULAWESI  15,689  na  na
North Sulawesi  16,023  65,716  4.1
South Sulawesi  15,722  78,138  5.0
Other Sulawesi /c  15,339  71,385  4.7
EASTERN  ISLANDS  16,054  na  na
West Nusa Tenggara  14,535  63,581  4.4
East Nusa Tenggara  16,061  85,164  5.3
Other Eastern  Islands /d  18,817  96,800  5.1
Source: Poverty Line data from World Bank (1993); KPM data from the Republic of
Indonesia (1994a).
a/ Includes Jambi and Bengkulu; KPM figure calculated as a simple average of the two.
b/ Includes Central and East Kalimantan; KPM figure calculated as a simple average.
c/ Includes Central and Southeast Sulawesi;  KPM figure calculated as a simple average.
d/ Includes Maluku; excludes East Timor and Irian Jaya.21
32.  To sum up, it appears that Indonesia's minimum  wages are already high, both by
international and by domestic standards, and caution must be exercised in raising them
further, for fear of eroding competitiveness, lowering employment growth and,
paradoxically, of increasing poverty.  There is little evidence that minimum  wages are an
effective tool for reducing poverty, which is largely a rural and informal sector
phenomenon in Indonesia. As discussed above, minimum wages tend to be complied with
only in a small part of the economy, namely, the formal, industrial sector.  Even there,
workers will not always experience an increase in their welfare because of higher minimum
wages since employers may respond to increases in minimum  wages by reducing other
forms of non-wage compensation that are not covered by minimum  wage law, such as
holidays, vacation, sick-leave pay, health insurance, and retirement benefits.  Anecdotal
evidence indicates that this substitution is indeed occurring in Indonesia and that some
employers have been withholding holiday bonus payments in response to the imposition of
higher minimum wages.
33.  Even when minimum  wages have a limited direct impact on the cost of labor,
either due to noncompliance or due to the downward adjustment of other benefits,
introducing unrealistically high minimum  wages could have a potentially large indirect cost
in the form of worker unrest and protest.  In Indonesia, as discussed below in Section VII,
the higher minimum wages mandated by law are raising workers' expectations, and in the
absence of enforcement mechanisms, are leading to non-compliance and increased worker
unrest.  Given that the costs of the minimum  wage policy are clearly  visible but its benefits
are not, reliance on minimum  wages as a poverty alleviation  tool should be reduced.
While it may be politically impossible  to eliminate minimum  wages, measures could be
taken to limit the negative impact of the minimum  wage legislation on employment and
labor costs  in Indonesia by limiting  further increases in the level of the minimum  wages,
and by limiting the scope of its coverage to larger firms and to a select group of employees
(for example, by excluding from its coverage students, trainees, and other groups with
lower productivity).
V.2  Non-Wage Compensation
34.  Social Security Policy in Indonesia --  In Indonesia, the Workers'  Social
Security, or JAMSOSTEK, law was enacted on February 17, 1992 in Law No. 3 of 1992.
JAMSOSTEK provides the following benefits to workers: (i) life insurance; (ii) retirement
(provident fund) benefits; (iii) free health care for workers, their spouses, and up to three
children; and (iv) workers' compensation insurance for work-related accidents and
illnesses. Every worker is entitled to JAMSOSTEK coverage, although there is provision
for participation to be phased in over time.  The current implementation regulations
restrict initial participation to firms with 10 or more employees or a payroll of more than
one million  rupiah.  For the health insurance program, employers who already have health
maintenance programs with superior benefits need not participate initially. Most of the
cost of the new social security program is to be funded by contributions from employers,
with a much smaller contribution (2 percent of wages for the old age provident fund
program) from workers.  These are fully-funded programs, without any provision for22
Government  subsidy. The legislation  requires  the entire  program  to be administered  by PT
ASTEK,  a state-owned  enterprise,  which  has thus far been  responsible  for administering
the previous,  much smaller,  program.
35.  Social Security Policy and Labor Costs - For analytical  purposes,
JAMSOSTEK is best conceptualized as the imposition of a tax on the use of labor by
employers, in order to fund the various benefits outlined above to employees.  Table 11
contains the estimated costs of the different components of the social security system,
expressed as percentages of wages (McLeod, 1993). It shows that for the average
worker, the total contribution for the social security program will be equivalent to a rather
steep 12 percent tax on wages.  If employers are unable to pass the tax on to employees in
the form of lower wages, say because of the presence of binding minimum wages, then the
total cost of labor will rise, and employment will fall. If employers are able to pass the tax
on to employees by lowering wages, then workers are still not better off because instead
of negotiating  the package  of benefits  that they want with their employers,  they are forced
to accept this particular package.  According to McLeod (1993), the JAMSOSTEK
approach "substitutes the coercive power of government for the bargaining power of trade
unions in attempting to force employers to provide improved benefits (of a particular kind)
to their employees" (p.89).
Table 11: Estimated Costs of the JAMSOSTEK Program in Indonesia
Program Component  Cost as a % of the Wage rate
Health Insurance  3.0-6.0%
Workers'  Compensation Insurance  0.24-1.76%
Retirement Fund  5.7%
Life Insurance  0.3%
Average Total Cost  12.0%
Source:  McLeod  (1993).
36.  The study referred  to above  on labor  legislation  in six APEC countries  also
compared  the legislated  social  security  program  in Indonesia  with those in the other five
countries (World Bank, 1994a). The study found that while the details of the programs
for old age, disability,  death,  sickness,  and work injury benefits  vary from country  to
country,  the  new social  security  program  in Indonesia,  JAMSOSTEK,  is relatively
ambitious  in coverage  and compares  favorably  to those in the more developed  APEC
countries.'0 The new legislation is a bold move for an economy at Indonesia's stage of
development -- countries such as South Korea introduced pension schemes at a much later
0  Details of the comparisons  are contained  in Annex  tables A2-A4. Table  A2 compares  legislation  for  old age,
disability and death  programs;  Table  A3 for sickness  benefits;  and Table A4 for work  injury  programs.23
stage.  While it may be viewed as an important step towards improving worker welfare,
given the size and the cost of the program, too rapid and rigid implementation is almost
certain to create problems. The cost implications of JAMSOSTEK, estimated at about 12
percent of the wage bill, are high and could have a  major effect on limiting the growth of
employment in Indonesia, especially in the smaller scale firms whose capacity to make
regular contributions is likely to be limited.  Furthermore, in the export sector, this
blanket social security program is likely to affect the ability  of firms to compete in
intemational markets.  Finally, since the legislation is initially  applicable only to medium-
and large firms (i.e., those with more than 10 employees or with a payroll of more than
one million rupiah), it might have the unintended and undesirable consequence of
increased informalization of the industrial sector, as employers try and evade this
additional tax on their revenues. In light of all these potentional problems, it is
appropriate that the Government move cautiously in implementing  the provisions of the
new legislation.
VI.  POLICIES  AFFECTING  THE QUALITY  OF LABOR
37.  While labor productivity in Indonesia has been increasing since 1985, it remains
low compared with its ASEAN neighbors (see Table 7 above).  There are a number of
complex factors that affect labor productivity, including the quantity and quality of human
and physical capital, working conditions, technology, and a host of institutional factors
pertaining, in particular, to the.  industrial relations system. This paper focuses only on the
role of labor market policies (broadly defined) in affecting productivity. Thus, in
explaining the low productivity of the Indonesian workforce, it looks at the role of: (a)
human resource development policies;  and (b) working conditions.
VI.1  Human Resource Development Policies
38.  One of the challenges currently facing Indonesia is how to upgrade the quality of
its stock of human capital. There is an urgent need to develop an effective strategy of
human resource development in order to  meet the needs of the 1  990s and beyond, when
the economy moves forward from its comparative advantage of a low-wage workforce
employing relatively low skills, towards an economy with higher productivity and raised
wages for its workforce, while at the same time maintaining its intemational
competitiveness. Other countries, including many of its neighbors in Asia, have
successfully made the transition that is now facing Indonesia. Their govermnents have
intervened in human resources development through expanding access to primary and
secondary education and raising its quality; supporting private training systems; expanding
public technical education and training, flexibly, in response to the needs for more skilled
workers; and encouraging employer-training. Below, we examine the education and
training policies in Indonesia with a view to identifying key constraints and policy options.24
39.  Education Policies  - Jones and Manning (1992) suggest that one of the most
dramatic changes in Indonesia in recent decades has been in the educational attainment of
its labor force.  As recently as 1971, 70 percent of the population of working age had no
education at all or incomplete primary education.  By 1990, this proportion had fallen to
44 percent.  Table 12 shows this dramatic improvement, and also indicates how this
change has been particularly striking for women.  Between 1971 and 1990, the proportion
of working age women with none or incomplete primary education has fallen from 78
percent to 50 percent; at the same time, the proportion of with secondary school
education has increased four-fold from 5 percent to 20 percent.
Table 12: Population Aged 15 Years and Older, by Educational Attainment in
Indonesia,  1961-1990
Percentage of Population with:
Year  No  Incomplete  Completed  Completed  Academic  Total
Schooling  Primary  Primary  Lower or  or  Percentage




1961  58  23  17  5  0.2  100
1971  32  29  27  10  0.7  100
1980  22  36  26  16  0.9  100
1990  12  24  32  29  2.5  100
Females
1961  80  11  7  2  0.0  100
1971  57  21  17  5  0.2  100
1980  41  30  19  9  0.3  100
1990  25  25  28  20  1.3  100
Both
Sexes
1961  68  17  12  3  0.1  100
1971  45  25  22  8  0.4  100
1980  32  33  22  12  0.6  100
1990  19  25  30  25  1.9  100
Source: Republic of Indonesia, Department of Manpower (1993).
40.  . Despite the improvement, the educational attainment of Indonesia's labor force is
low (4.6 years of education) compared with Malaysia and the Philippines (more than 7
years in both) (Jones, 1989). This is due to the slow movement of older, poorly educated
cohorts out of the labor force in Indonesia. As Figure 6 indicates, the educational gradient
from the younger to the older ages is very steep indeed. Among the population aged 15-
19 in 1993, only 10 percent had less than a complete primary school education; the25
comparative figure for those aged 60-64  was 74 percent.  This is testimony to the success
of the compulsory education policies instituted in the 1970s. As the older workers leave
the workforce and new entrants who have grown up in the era of compulsory education
move into the labor market, the educational levels of the workforce can be expected to
rise rapidly.
Figure  6: Indonesia:  Education  of Labor  Force
by Age Group, 1993
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41.  In Indonesia's first 25-year development plan, educational policy focused on
increasing access to schooling opportunities, centered on an extensive school building
program.  This led to an expansion in enrollment rates at all levels of education.  As a
result, enrollment rates in Indonesia now compare favorably with those in the comparator
countries for all levels of education (Table 13).26
Table 13: Comparative Educational Enrollment Rates, 1991
Percentage of Age Group Enrolled in Education
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary
Indonesia
Total  116  45  10
Female  114  41  na
Malaysia
Total  93  58  7
Female  93  59  na
Philippines
Total  110  74  28
Female  111  75  na
Thailand
Total  113  33  16
Female  88  32  na
Source: World Development Report, World Bank( 1994b).
42.  While the quantity of education has improved dramatically in Indonesia, major
educational challenges lie ahead for the Government of Indonesia (World Bank, 1994c).
In primary education: about 23 percent of those who enter grade 1 (mostly children of
poor families) never complete their  primary education; every year, 1.2 million children
drop out of primary education; every year, 1.2 million  primary graduates do not continue
to secondary schools.  Secondary school intake has been faltering in the past five years,
resulting in sluggish enrollments at the junior and senior secondary levels. In higher
education, low quality and efficiency  are a concem.
43.  Central to meeting these challenges is the enhancement of the quality of education
at all levels of education.  At the primary level, it is obvious that with the expansion of
access already achieved, the focus needs to shift to raising quality.  The present low
quality is reflected in low wage differentials  between workers with and without primary
education (McMahon and Boendiono, 1992). At the secondary level also, a new strategy
is needed to boost the quality of education in the light of recent flagging enrollment rates.
Again, the present low quality of junior secondary education is reflected in low wage
differentials between those w'th and without such education.  Corroborating evidence is
provided by intemational comparisons which show that Indonesia's primary and secondary
students lag behind their regional counterparts in reading competency tests (Table 14).  At
the tertiary level, the role of public institutions needs to be redefined in order to provide
efficient, diversified, and better-quality services for post-secondary education.27
Table 14: Comparative Reading Achievement Test Score, 1992





Hong Kong  75.5
Source: World Bank (1994c).
44.  The Government has put forth ambitious targets for improving the quantity and
quality of education in the Sixth Five Year Development Plan, REPELITA VI (1994/95-
1998/99).  Key goals include: expanding access for junior secondary education with a
view to achieving universal 9-year education within the next 10 to  15 years; targeting the
poor, especially in primary education; providing quality-enhancing  inputs such as
textbooks and a better incentive system for teachers; improving educational content to
ensure relevance, especially for primary and secondary education; improving quality of
higher education, with emphasis on staff upgrading; placing greater emphasis on science
and engineering programs as well as research in higher education; increasing access to pre-
school education through enhanced community participation; and increasing emphasis on
vocational secondary education. However, given the Government's limited resources, not
all ofthese  objectives appear affordable. The World Bank (1994c) therefore argues for
selectivity and cautions against further expansion of the basic educational system without
first addressing the critical issue of improving its quality and bringing Indonesia's rate of
educational attainment up towards comparable standards in the region.
45.  Training Policies - Skill levels have grown in Indonesia's labor force due to
general education gains and due to the increased investment in training facilities and
various forms of on-the-job training.  Skill training is now available through a number of
means, including: vocational senior secondary schools, which account for about 1.3
million (or one-third) of senior secondary enrollments; 153 public training centers (BLKs
and KLKs) which offer short, specialized courses; numerous privately run programs,
largely in general skills training with little capital investments needs ( e.g., commercial
skills); and some large enterprises that provide training for their workers (World Bank,
1992).  A number of  polytechnics, established in the mid-1970s, also provide diploma
programs for mid-level technicians in engineering and commercial subjects.
46.  Despite the large supply of training facilities, demand for training appears to be
weak.  A recent study (World Bank, 1991  a) that focused on employment and training
issues in the dynamic export-oriented manufacturing sector found that training activities
were weak even in this subsector.  The study was based on a survey of 140 enterprises
engaged in export-oriented manufacturing. It found  that employers did not consider the
skill level of their workers to be a problem, reflecting the low skill nature of production.28
However, many were concerned about the low quality of products, missed deadlines and
wastage, to which poor skills of workers would quite likely be a contributory factor.  The
study also found that extemal and internal markets for skilled workers and supervisors
were active.  Very few skilled workers had received formal pre-career training, and those
who did, did so in private training centers. Most skilled workers picked up their skills
through experience: over half of the persons sampled reported that they had received no
training since starting work.  About 30 large firms in capital intensive industry had good
training centers, but the relatively low technology, labor-intensive manufacturing
industries that were predominant in the sample did not need high levels of skills. Most of
the firms, therefore, did not have training facilities, particularly small establishments, which
did very little training.  Training budgets were tiny. However, off-the-job training
appeared to improve workers' productivity as suggested by their enhanced earnings.
47.  The key issue in skills training, as in basic education, appears to be one of  poor
quality rather than limited quantity.  Evaluations of public secondary technical schools
have pointed to deficiencies in equipment and teaching materials, weak links with industry,
and a lack of flexibility in what is a highly  centralized system. And with some exceptions,
most private vocational secondary schools have inadequate facilities. Assessment of
government skills training centers have also found limitations in teachers, equipment and
materials, inadequate links with industry, and like technical schools, little autonomy and
flexibility  in resource use.  Private training institutions also suffer from problems of poor
quality.  Since they are largely financed through student fees, program scope and quality
are limited to keeping costs at affordable levels. Courses concentrate on subjects that
require relatively little capital investment and are sufficiently  general to permit large
classes.  There is usually little objective information about the quality of these courses to
guide individual choices. Finally, most manufacturing enterprises still lack the capacity to
provide in-service training themselves.  Only a small number of large companies have
good quality programs, with diseconomies of scale and lack of resources preventing
smaller firms from providing  job-specific training.
48.  As Indonesia makes the transition during the next decade from a country with a
comparative advantage in cheap labor to one in skilled labor, it will need to upgrade and
expand its vocational training sector.  Such a change, however, will need to be managed
carefully due to the inherent difficulties in predicting the pace, direction, and technological
level of industrial change.  In such an uncertain and changing environment, one of the
most crucial features of the skill acquisition system will need to be its responsiveness to
the changing skill demands. At the same time, the system will need to provide skills of a
quality that is acceptable to trainees and employers. Given that resources available for
education and training are necessarily limited, policymakers face important tradeoffs
between expenditures on education and expenditures on training.  When faced with these
choices, it needs to be kept in mind that having a sound basic education is a prerequisite
for developing a skilled and flexible  workforce.  Workers with solid basic skills with
words, numbers, and concepts can be readily trained and retrained to meet changing job
needs, making effective use of available training.  Experience in other countries indicates
that greater reliance on training by employers themselves and by private training29
institutions can increase the effectiveness  and responsiveness of the training system (World
Bank, 1991b). Thus, the Government's comparative advantage vis a vis the private sector
might lie in providing sound basic education to the population rather than in specific
training to the workforce.
VI.2  Conditions of Work
49.  Since the mid-  I 980s, Indonesia has experienced spectacular growth in the
industrial sector.  However, according to Kemp (1994), there appears to have been little
commensurate activity to ensure adherence to tolerable labor standards, including those
related to occupational health, working hours and welfare. Industrialization has brought a
proliferation of hazards: mechanical, chemical, biological and ergonomic that were not a
feature of traditional life. As of yet, little has been done in Indonesia, in comparison with
other ASEAN states, to quantify the effect of working in a  factory environment on the
physical and psychological health of workers.  While the larger corporations have the
capital base and the managerial spirit to pursue reforms in the area of occupational health
and safety, the majority (70 percent) of Indonesian workers work in domestically owned
factories or those which are joint ventures with other East Asian economies, such as
Korea or Taiwan, China. These factories are notable for "their poor conditions, harsh
management, and excessive hours of work" (Kemp, 1994).  These factors are likely to be
some of the major reasons underlying the low productivity of workers in the
manufacturing sector in Indonesia.
50.  The recent World Bank (1994a) study on labor legislation also provided a
comparative perspective on the legislation governing minimum labor standards for
conditions of work, such as: hours of work, rest period, overtime, annual leave with pay,
minimum age of employment, menstrual leave, maternity leave, and bonus and profit
sharing in the six countries." 1 It found that Indonesian standards regulating minimum
conditions of work are at least as generous as those in the other five APEC countries.  In
Malaysia, for example, it found that pioneer companies could not negotiate collective
agreements that grant better terms and conditions than those provided in the Employment
Act.  In other words, in Malaysia, the law actually stipulates maximum rather than
minimum conditions of employment in these companies. Another contrast from Indonesia
is the U.S., which provides fewer federally-mandated standards. While the various states
in the U.S. are free to legislate their own labor standards, in practice most terms and
conditions of employment are established by free collective bargaining between labor
organizations and employers, or by agreement between individuals and employers if no
union has been certifiedlrecognized in that workplace.
51.  The reasons for the poor working conditions of the industrial workforce in
Indonesia do not appear to lie in inadequate legislation for occupational health, working
hours and other conditions of work.  Instead, they appear to lie in the difficulties
associated with enforcing the centrally-mandated standards. The main problem appears to
11  Details of the comparison  are contained  in Annex  Table  A5.30
be that Indonesian labor laws rely on centralized enforcement systems rather than utilizing
workplace delegates as the basis of self-regulation. As discussed in Section VII, this
situation is exacerbated by the absence of independent trade unions through which
workers'  representation and advocacy in disputes concerning labor standards could be
underpinned by institutional support and information.  Since workers do not have the
right to organize and form independent unions, they are unable to legitimately participate
in activities which monitor and regulate their working conditions. This results in
widespread absence of adherence to the standards for working conditions, and results in
poor conditions of work, especially in the industrial sector, and especially for women
(Katjasungkana, 1993).
52.  The situation for women workers in the industrial sector in Indonesia is
particularly troubling. Box I below describes the poor and potentially life-threatening
living conditions of female workers in a textile factory in Indonesia and illustrates how
even large companies in Indonesia can violate labor regulations and agreements
(Katjasungkana, 1993). These unsatisfactory conditions of living show a disregard for
labor regulations, and were clearly a violation of agreements reached in the KKB
(Collective Labor Agreement) between the management and the workers, in  which the
company had promised to provide adequate housing facilities for its workers.  Secondly,
the rule in the KKB which obliged all women workers to live in a dormitory, which had
facilities appropriate only for single women, stood in direct contradiction to the rule within
the same KKB that guarantees maternity leave with pay for all women workers, up to and
including the third child. The KKB also discriminated against female workers: the men
working for the same company were not required to live in the dormitories.
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53.  While Indonesia is particularly generous relative to the other countries in laws
mandating special leaves for women, such as maternity and menstrual leave, the reality
appears to be that women are in most cases disallowed from taking either type of leave.
The American Association of Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) in collaboration with SPSI
(Indonesia's only Government-sanctioned trade union) interviewed 11,615 workers from
non-unionized factories in Java (1992).  It found that only 38 percent of women workers
were able to take menstruation leave; of them, 11 percent were not paid for the leave
while another 12 percent were paid below the daily minimum  wage.  The Survey also
found that of those who applied for maternity leave, only 47 percent received it, and of
these, only 12 percent were paid for that leave. There are also ample documented cases of
women being fired because of marriage, pregnancy or birth. Thus, while the laws on
menstrual and maternity leave provide benefits to some female employees, they also open
others to abuse and discrimination by employers. The menstrual leave, for example, has
often been used as a means to harass female workers, and could easily be abandoned and
replaced by sick leave, as necessary.
54.  Poor working conditions not only have a direct effect on costs through lowered
worker morale and productivity, but also have an indirect cost through increased labor
unrest.  In addition to the lack of enforcement of minimum  wages, one of the major
grievances underlying the increased number of strikes by workers in recent years is their
poor working conditions (Manning, 1992). There have been a number of reported abuses
of the labor regulations regarding hours worked and overtime rates, especially in the
export-oriented factories, which operate intensively  at certain times to meet peak orders.
The newspaper reports on labor disputes are replete with examples of workers who, on
threat of dismissal, are forced to work 12-14 hours a day without adequate overtime
compensation.  Given this situation, and given that pushing for further increases in
minimum  wages would most likely erode competitiveness and reduce employment, it
would seem prudent for those concerned with the plight of workers to press for reforms in
areas in which workers face the greatest hardship and abuse, and in which changes will not
substantially increase labor costs but will have the potential to raise labor productivity.
Such areas include effective worker representation, worker safety, and the quality of the
work environment. Making employers aware of potential "efficiency  wage" effects -- the
impact of better wages, working conditions and overall systems of labor management on
labor productivity--  can also have an important effect on labor's welfare.
VH.  POLICIES  AFFECTING  THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  CLIMATE
55.  The early 1990s have seen a marked increase in labor unrest in Indonesia,
principally in the centers of manufacturing export activity. An important reason for this
unrest is the rising expectations of workers for an improvement in their welfare, combined
with the unenforceability of, and resulting non-compliance  with, the centrally-mandated
benefits, such as higher minimum  wages and the new all-encompassing social security
systern. Enfo,ceability of Government-mandated benefits is likely to be weak in most32
developing countries; in Indonesia, this problem is exacerbated by the absence of
independent unions to represent workers.  An additional problem is that the legal and
regulatory framework does not provide for effective dispute resolution mechanisms
between employers and employees, making strikes the only way for workers to air their
grievances.  This Section examines the Government's policies and procedures governing
the industrial relations system in Indonesia, snd the implications of these policies for
peaceful labor relations.
VI.1.  Regulation of Unions
56.  Freedom of Association, Formation of Independent Workers' Organizations,
and Collective Bargaining -- A comparison of the legislation governing the formation
and operation of labor unions in six APEC countries shows that Indonesian laws do indeed
restrict the ability of workers' organizations at the plant level to effectively represent
workers to management (World Bank, 1994a).' 2 The Indonesian Constitution says that
the "freedom of association and assembly" shall be prescribed by statute.  There are two
such laws that clearly guarantee the right to form unions. 13 Despite these laws, however,
setting up unions in Indonesia is not easy, and there is only one legally-recognized union in
the private sector--the SPSI (All Indonesia Workers Union)--which, for all practical
purposes, is essentially  a tightly-controlled Government institution.  The ineffectiveness of
SPSI is reflected in the fact that unionization rates in Indonesia are amongst the lowest in
the world (see Table 15); these rates would probably rise if workers had more effective
unions to choose from.
12 Details of the comparison  are contained  in Annex  Table  A6.
3 The first is Law  No. 18 of 1956,  which  made the ILO  Convention  No. 98,  on the Right to Organize  and Bargain
Collectively,  a law. The  second  is the Basic  Law  No. 14  of 1969,  which  explicitly  grants "the right to set up
and to become  a member  of a manpower  union".33
Table 15: Union Membership  as Percent  of Non-Agricultural  Work  Force
in Middle-Income  Economies
Union Density  Upper  Middle  Income  Lower Middle  Income
Countries  Countries
>50 percent  Israel,  Brazil  Colombia,  Egypt, Jordan
40-50 percent  Congo,  El Salvador,
Morocco
30-40 percent  Argentina,  Libya  Jamaica,  Guatemala,
Honduras
20-30 percent  Trinidad,  Uruguay,  Bolivia,  Costa Rica, Syria
Venezuela,  and Taiwan,
China
10-20  percent  Hong Kong,  Malaysia,  Tunisia,  Paraguay,  Papua
Mexico,  South Africa,  New Guinea,  Chile,.  Nigeria,
Singapore,  Korea, Panama  Zimbabwe,  Dominican
Republic,  Peru, Ecuador,
Lesotho,  Philippines
5-10 percent  Puerto Rico  Botswana,  Mauritania,
Turkey
<5 percent  Oman,  Saudi  Arabia  Indonesia,  Thailand
Source:  Freeman  (1993).
57.  The lack of genuine  representation  of workers  and of effective  collective
bargaining  at the plant  level  in Indonesia  is attributed,  in part, to Government  regulations
which  make it impossible  to set up alternate  legal  worker  organizations  to the SPSI. The
Government  has recently  brought  out new regulations  in an attempt  to address some  of
these criticisms.  However,  Government  decrees  essentially  prevent  the formation  of
independent  unions. While  workers  in the private  sector, including  those in export-
processing  zones,  are free to form worker organizations  or company  level  unions,  only
registered  unions  can negotiate  binding  collective  labor agreements  with employers.  In
February 1993,  a new regulation  eased  the organizational  requirements  for a union  to
receive  recognition  from the Department  of Manpower. Yet the conditions  for
recognition  are still  considered  to be rather  restrictive.34
58.  While Indonesian law clearly guarantees the right to form unions, the World Bank
study (1994a) on comparative labor legislation found that difficulties  arise in Indonesia in
how the unions are regulated and how they are allowed to operate in practice. The study
found that of  the six countries, Chilean and U.S. laws are more favorable to genuine plant
level collective bargaining by independent worker organizations. In the other four
countries, various regulations prevent this from happening effectively. For example, in the
case of Indonesia and Malaysia, while plant level collective bargaining is legally permitted,
it is restricted in practice by preventing plant level unions from becoming legal
organizations. Another example of regulations that prevent genuine plant level collective
bargaining is the imposition of contrato-ley type contracts (or industry-wide collective
contracts) by the Governments of Mexico, Korea and Indonesia. In another recent study
focusing on labor relations in six economies of East Asia, Freeman (1993) notes that  "the
seemingly innocuous procedure for registering trade unions is a powerful tool for
repression".' 4 He found that some of the regimes in East Asia had used this tool to direct
workers into acceptable unions and to make other unions unacceptable.
59.  The Resolution of Disputes in the Context of Collective Negotiations and the
Right to Strike -- Restrictions on the right to strike, apparent inefficiencies  and delays in
the process of resolving disputes between workers and employers, and the intervention of
the military in labor affairs, further undermine the ability  of Indonesian workers to
organize and act collectively. The procedure for resolving disputes arising in the process
of collective bargaining is provided in Act 22 of 1957 on the Settlement of Labor
Disputes.  This Act  was promulgated to limit strikes and lock-outs and in effect also
establishes compulsory arbitration. In response to the recent criticisms, three Ministerial
Decrees on the implementation of the Act were repealed and replaced with a new
Ministerial Decree in January 1994.
60.  The Indonesian Law provides for elaborate dispute resolution procedures and for
the right to strike, if conciliation fails or if employers refuse to negotiate.  In practice,
however, there are several problems which in effect limit the ability of workers to
negotiate with employers. First, the law assumes that workers will be adequately
represented in disputes by unions, which does not appear to be the case.  Second, the
process of dispute settlement  and mediation is often subject to delays. Third, the
independence of various bodies involved in the mediation process, such as the Labor
Tribunal and the Central Committee, is questionable. Fourth, the procedure, in effect, sets
up compulsory arbitration.  Fifth, the right to strike is severely limited. Sixth, and finally,
the military is often involved to some degree or the other in the labor disputes.
61.  Labor unrest in Indonesia can be attributed, at least in part, to the problems listed
above with the dispute settlement mechanisms and to the lack of confidence of workers in
the SPSI as true representatives of workers at the firm level. Workers typically by-pass
the normal industrial relations procedures and seek assistance from the national or regional
parliaments or from NGOs such as the Legal Aid Institute.  Because strikes are permitted
14 The  economies  in Freanan's study  are Korea, Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  Malaysia,  Japan,  and Taiwan,  China.35
only within a restricted set of circumstances that seldom apply, most strikes that do take
place are illegal. Employers are also known to use the Ministerial Regulation No. 4
(1986), which permits them to dismiss workers if they are absent for six consecutive days,
to justify dismissal of striking workers.
62.  The World Bank (1994a) study on labor legislation also provided a comparative
perspective on legislation governing dispute resolution procedures and the right to strike
in the six APEC countries. 15 It showed that Indonesian laws in this area are very
restrictive and, in many ways, very similar to those in Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, in
Korea.  In Malaysia also, the right to strike is very restricted and in fact, the Minister of
Labor has substantial powers to intervene in the dispute resolution process and may
impose compulsory arbitration through the Industrial Court.  Furthermore, in Malaysia,
the arbitration procedure in the Industrial Court is reported to be slow and protracted.
Korean laws also similarly  set out elaborate dispute resolution mechanisms and the laws
on strikes resemble those of  Indonesia and Malaysia. In contrast, workers in the three
countries on the American continent--the U.S., Chile and Mexico--are less restricted in
their right to strike and have access to better dispute resolution mechanisms. The labor
codes of the three American countries are also more specific on the liabilities  of workers in
case of strikes.
63.  More specifically,  the three East Asian countries in the study were found to restrict
the right to strike in several ways: through requiring notification of a strike and a cooling-
off period; restricting the subjects over which strikes are legal; and by suspending the right
to strike under various circumstances. In Indonesia and Malaysia, conciliation by a
Ministry of Labor official typically occurs even before a strike is anticipated, and can lead
to a process which is compulsory and in which decisions are binding. The right to strike is
much less restricted in the three American countries, even though, for example, Chilean
legislation does not permit sympathy strikes and Mexican law establishes a cooling-off
period in strikes.  Collective bargaining contracts typically establish processes for the
resolution of disputes in the U.S. and frequently provide for arbitration, a procedure which
has worked rather successfully  in the U.S., in contrast to Latin American countries.  What
is extremely interesting to note is that although it is easier to go on strike in the three
countries on the American continent, the number of strikes that occur there is actually
quite small, partly due to the availability  of effective dispute resolution mechanisms. For
example, the number of strikes as a proportion of contract negotiations was only 2.5
percent in 1990 in the U.S., and only 4 percent in 1991/92 in Chile. This is important  to
note for a country like Indonesia where the number of strikes is increasing rapidly, despite
very restrictive regulations governing the right to strike, because of the lack of effective
dispute resolution mechanisms.
15 Details of the comparison  are provided  in Annex  Table  A7.36
VII.2  Union Regulations and the Industrial Relations Climate
64.  Labor unrest in Indonesia has increased in the 1990s. The number of strikes
during the four year period 1989-92 went up thirteen-fold from 19 to 251 (see Table 16).
During this period, the number of strikers also increased dramatically: it went up more
than a hundred-fold from 1,168 strikers to 143,005 strikers (i.e., from 0.4 strikers to 5.2
strikers per 1,000 non-agricultural workers).  Most importantly, the economic loss from
these strikes, as measured in the number of working days lost, increased the fastest (over
35-fold): from about twenty-nine thousand hours in 1989 to over a million  hours in 1992.
The rapid increase in the number of strikers involved and the amount of work-hours lost is
a cause for concern.
Table 16: Number and Nature of Strikes in Indonesia, 1989-1992
Year  No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of Strikers  % of all Strikes
Strikes  Strikers  Work-  per 1,000 Non-  in
Hours Lost  Agricultural  Manufacturing
Workers
1989  19  1,168  29,257  0.4  68
1990  61  27,839  229,959  0.8  89
1991  130  64,474  534,610  1.8  96
1992  251  143,005  1,019,654  5.2  na
Source: Republic of Indonesia (1994b) and staff estimates.
65.  This pattern of increasing labor unrest in Indonesia in the l 990s is a change from
past trends (Table 17).  During the 25-year period, mid-1960s to  1990, Indonesia had one
of the smallest number of strikes and strikers (as a share of its non-agricultural work-
force) as compared with other countries in the region. Industrial unrest remained high in
the Philippines over the entire period, and grew dramatically  worse in Korea in the second
half of the 1980s. In Thailand and Malaysia, by comparison, the industrial relations
climate seems to have improved considerably, especially during the second half of the
1980s.37
Table 17: Comparison of Strikes in South-East Asia, 1966-1990
(average per annum)
Indonesia  Thailand  Philippines  Malaysia  Korea
No. of Strikes
1966-70  2  15  108  55  11
1976-80  66  49  54  40  104
1986-90  46  9  333  13  1,541
No. of Strikers per 1,000 Non-Agricultural Workers
1966-70  0.0  0.5  9.8  10.3  4.1
1976-80  0.6  3.6  4.8  3.8  2.3
1986-90  0.2  0.3  9.3  0.7  28.5
% of Strikers in Manufacturing
1966-70  1  26  40  12  47
1976-80  89  79  33  61  85
1986-90  82 (a)  99  55  28  46
Total Non-Agricultural Workforce (millions)
1986-90  32  9  11  4  13
(a)  % of strikes (not strikers).
Source:  Manning (1993b).
66.  It is not just the increasing number of strikes that has drawn public attention but
also the fact that many of these strikes occurred in export-oriented zones close to Jakarta,
especially Tangerang and Bekasi, where foreign capital plays a major role.  Summaries of
the 47 major strikes reported in the major national newspapers in 1991 indicate the
following pattem:  just over half of all strikes occurred in the labor-intensive textile,
clothing and footwear sectors;  almost all of these took place in Jakarta and the
surrounding areas (Jabotabek), which accounted for over 70 percent of all strikes; close to
half the strikes occurred in establishments  with 500 workers or more; and finally, a few of
the strikes involved thousands of workers and extended over several days (Manning,
1993b).
67.  What have been the major worker grievances? Unlike a decade earlier when
dismissals were a major reason for labor disputes, concem with wages and working
conditions have been the main cause of recent unrest.  These strikes have primarily been
associated with lack of compliance with the minimum  wage legislation introduced in 1990-
91 and with unsatisfactory working conditions (Manning, 1993b). The reason for the
increase in strikes since 1991 is not that conditions deteriorated visibly in 1991, but that38
public awareness of the gap between minimum  physical needs (KPM) and minimum wages
increased.  In addition, with the passage of legislation, the Ministry of Manpower started
to give greater emphasis to the enforcement of the regional minimum  wages.  Added to
this was a range of  abuses of labor law regulations regarding hours worked and overtime
rates, especially in the export-oriented factories.
68.  The reason why worker dissatisfaction with wages and working conditions has led
to an increase in strikes can be attributed in part to the inability of workers to engage in
productive negotiations with employers, stemming from a lack of  confidence in unions
and in the dispute resolution process.  In particular, one can attribute the spread of labor
protests and strikes to the failure of the officially  sanctioned trade union movement, the
SPSI, to represent workers' rights and to negotiate more favorable work conditions.
Most of the labor unrest has occurred independently of union presence at the plant level.
Few strikes or protests have been initiated by unions, many of which are headed at plant
level by personnel managers or other managerial staff (Manning, 1992).  In the absence of
adequate dispute resolution mechanisms,  wildcat strikes and walkouts remain as one of the
limited options available to workers to engage in productive negotiations with employers.
69.  Indonesia is under pressure, both internally  and externally, to ease restrictions on
unions.  In considering future policy, it would be important to consider that effective,
democratic, plant level worker organizations, by providing "voice" at the workplace, may
be able to play a positive role and reduce some of the costs associated with worker unrest.
Legislation encouraging collective bargaining at the enterprise level could enable workers
and managers to negotiate outcomes that might be able to enhance workers' productivity.
Improving the dispute resolution mechanism and the ability of the workers to be heard can
reduce the incidence of illegal or wildcat strikes.  What would be needed, however, would
be more than legislative changes. In order to move to a mutually beneficial industrial
relations system, appropriate and responsible changes in behavior from employers and
workers would also be required.  Careful changes in legislation, industrial relations
practices, and increased deregulation and competition in product markets could improve
the positive role that unions can play while controlling their "negative" role.39
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Table Al:  MINIMUM  WAGE LEGISLATION
Minimum Wage Established by  Monthly I Daily  / Hourly Wage?
Law?
Yes (early 1970's)  Daily wage  based  on a 7 hour workday  and
Indonesia  40 hour workweek.
No (Historically  some minimum  wage Not applicable
fixing  for special  categories  such as
Malaysia  shop  assistants,  cinema  workers  etc.
which is now redundant  for all
practical  purposes).
Yes (Since 1988;  law  was passed  on  Hourly. Also  determined  on the basis  of a
Korea  Dec 31, 1986).  day,  week or month but in these cases  is also





Yes under Fair labor  Standards  Act  Hourly
(FSLA, 1938). Applies  to covered
enterprises  which  have  employees
United  producing,  or otherwise
States  handling/selling/working  on, goods
for interstate  commerce. States  may
set higher minimum  wages.45
Table Al:  MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION  (Contd.)
Specified nominally or relative to  Includes the value of Non-Wage Benefits?
some other wage/price index?
Adjusted according to Consumer Price  No.  Includes basic wage and fixed
Index (CPI). Specified separately by  allowances received in the form of money
Indonesia  regions & sectors/subsectors.  excluding incentive allowances.
Reviewed regularly in recent years.
Proposal from regional (tripartite)
wage boards to go through heads of
local government to Minister of Labor.
Based on minimum physical needs
(KFM), cost of living and labor market
conditions.
Not Applicable  Not Applicable
Malaysia
Nominal.  A national minimum wage  Not typically. But definition of "wage" in law
is determined according to category of  is "money and goods paid to worker by
industry, once a year, by deliberations  employer in the form of wage, salary or other
Korea  between Minister of Labor and  goods for labor service offered by worker."
Minimum Wage Council (tripartite).  Wages regarded as inappropriate for
Based on cost-of-living, productivity,  inclusion may be defined by Minister of
similar prevailing wages.  Labor.
Nominal.  Based on a tripartite  No
Chile  agreement, wages are adjusted as per
the projected CPI and productivity.
Determined annually by geographic  No
zone and by occupation by a tripartite
National Commission. Takes into
Mexico  account for each family satisfaction of
material, social and cultural needs and
to provide for mandatory education of
children and condition of occupation.
Nominal.  In setting and adjusting the  Reasonable cost or fair value of board,
minimum wage, consideration is given  lodging, or other facilities customarily
to views of all segments of economy,  furnished by the employer for the employee's
United  including workers' & employers'  benefit may be considered part of wages
States  organizations in open hearings in  unless excluded under the terms of a bona
Senate and House.  Since 1938,  fide collective bargaining agreement.
adjustments were made effective in:
1949, 55, 61, 63, 67, 68, 74, 75, 76,
78, 79, 80, 81, 90, 91.46
Table Al:  MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION  (Cont'd)
Ratio of Current Minimum Wage  Coverage
to average Manufacturing Wage*
0.51  in Jakarta in Nov 1991.  All industrial workers regardless of employment
Slightly higher ratio likely for 1994.  status.  Includes contract/unit/piece workers,
Indonesia  probationary workers and apprentices.
Not Applicable  Not Applicable
Malaysia
0.25 (estimate for 1993).  All businesses/workplaces with at least 5
permanent workers except only family/domestic
workers. The minimum wage may apply to
some places with less than 5 permanent
Korea  workers and is determined separately for
workers below the age of 18, with less than 6
months work, and for piece work workers etc.
by Presidential Decree. It does not apply to
workers on probation, training, or to
handicapped workers.
0.2 (estimate).  100%
Chile
1990: 0.13 of average unskilled  Includes piece-rate and other workers.
Mexico  manufacturing wages (as computed
from firm level data).  Estimates
_from  household level data are higher.
0.45-0.5 until April 1990; 0.38 in  All businesses  with annual gross volume of
1991.  sales/ business of at least $500,000. Employees
of firms not covered may also be subject to
FLSA minimum wage if they are individuals
United  engaged in interstate commerce. Domestics are
States  included. Exemptions are narrowly defined.
Subminimum wages are certified by the
Department Of Labor for handicapped workers,
Itrainees, students, etc.
*Approximate estimates.  For Indonesia this is based on available published statistics, Chile and Korea
from Embassy Economic Units. Mexico, Bell 1994.  Must be interpreted cautiously because of different
sources.47
Table A2: OLD AGE, DISABILrTY  AND  DEATH  PROGRAMS
Type of System  Coverage
Indonesia  Provident  Fund System  (lump-sum,  Establishments  with 10  or more employees  or a payroll
periodical  and partial lump-sum  benefits)  of at least 1 million  Rupiah  a month and those already
on earlier scheme. Coverage  is being extended  gradually
to smaller establishments  and to casual  or seasonal
workers. Voluntary  coverage  is available.
Malaysia  Dual provident  find (lump-sum  benefits  Provident  Fund: employed  workers. Teachers  and
only) and social  insurance  systems  members  of armed  forces  in equivalent  private  plans are
(disability  only)  excluded. Voluntary  coverage  for domestics. Disabilitv
pension:  employees  earning less  than M$2000  a month
(or when  first covered),casual  workers  and domestics.
Voluntary  for those earning more  than M$2000 a month
if employer and employee agree.
Korea  Social  Insurance  System  Korean  nationals 18-59  living  in Korea,  employed  in
firms with  at least 5 workers. Voluntary  coverage  for
smaller  firms and self-employed.  Private school  teachers
have  separate  systems  (as do public  employees,  military
personnel)
Chile (new  Mandatory  Private  Insurance  Mandatory  coverage  for wage  and salary workers.
system,  Voluntary coverage  for self-employed.
1980,81)
Mexico  Social  Insurance  System  Employees,  members  of producers', agricultural,  and
credit  union cooperatives.  Coverage  is being extended
gradually  to rural areas. Coverage  to be extended  by
decree  to agricultural  workers,  small  businesses,  forestry,
industrial  cooperatives,  self-employed,  family  workers,
domestics.  Voluntary coverage  is available. System  of
Saving  for Retirement  (SAR)  is mandatory  for all
employees,  and members  of agricultural  and credit union
=________  __________________________________  cooperatives.
United  Social  Insurance  System  Gainfilly occupied  persons,  including  self-employed.
States  Exclusions:  casual  agricultural  and domestic
employment,  limited  self-employment  (annual net
income  less  than $400)  and some  Federal employees
hired  before 1984. Voluntary  coverage  for State,  Local
Government  employees  covered  elsewhere,  otherwise
_mandatory.48
Table A2:  OLD AGE, DISABILrrY AND  DEATH PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Source of Funds  Qualifying Conditions
Indonesia  Insured person: 2% of earnings;  Old Age Benefit: Age 55 or retirement. May be paid before
Employer: 3.7% of payroll (plus 0.3% of  55 under certain circumstances. Disabilitv: Total incapacity
payroll for death benefit).  Government:  for work and under 55.  Benefits may be paid to spouse or
none.  orphan children in case of death. Payable lump-sum,
penodical or partly lump-sum.
Malaysia  Insured Person:  10% of earnings  Old Age: Age 55 & retirement from employment.
according to 306 wage classes for  Disability: provident fund-permanently incapacitated before
provident  fund; disability insurance,  55 with 2/3 loss of earning capacity, disability pension-24
approximately 0.5% of earnings  months of contribution in the last 40 months or in 2/3 of
according to 24 wage classes.  Employer: months since entry into insurance with minimum of 24
12% of payroll according to wage class  months (reduced pension if contributions in 1/3 months
for provident flnd.  For disability  with minimum of 24).Survivors Benefits: provident
insurance, approx 0.5% by wage class.  fund:nomination as beneficiary by insured. Survivor
Government: none.  pension: death occurs while in receipt of disability pension
on or before age 55.  Death benefit:lnsured was under age
60 at death.
Korea  Insured person:2% of earnings in 1993,  Old-Age Pension: Aged 60, insured 20 or more years.
rising to 3% in 1998; self-employed, 6%  Reduced if age 60-64 and still working; if aged 60 or more
of earnings in 1993 rising to 9% in  and insured for 15-19 years; aged 55-59 and insured for 20
1998. Employer:2% of payroll, rising to  or more years; aged 45-59 on 1/1/88 and insured for 5 years
3% in 1988. Government:Admninistrative  after that date.  Disabilitv pension: Insured at least I year,
costs.  not working.  Survivor pension spouse/child/parent,  of
insured (insured at least I year) or pensioner.  Lump Sum
refund if insured has less than  15 years coverage, if
requested
Chile (new  Insured Person: old-age-minimum 10%  Old age: men age 65, women age 60. 20 years contribution
system,  of wage or salary. Disability and  for new entrants.  Early retirement permitted if pension at
1980,81)  survivor-approx 3.3% depending on  least 50% of average wage over last 10 years and is at least
pension fund administrator.  Employer:  equal to 110% of minimum old-age pension. Disability:
None.  Government: Special subsidies  loss of 2/3 capacity to work.  Partial disability payable if
for guaranteed minimum provision.  1/2-2/3 loss of capacity.  Survivor: deceased was covered or
Maximum earnings (adjusted monthly to  was pensioner at death .
changes in the consumer price index) are
established for contribution purposes.
Mexico  Insured person: 1.85% of average  Old aze pension: Age 65, fractions of pension for age 60-64
earnings.  Employer: 5.18% of payroll.  if involuntarily unemployed. 500 weeks of contribution.
Government: 0.3% of payroll for most  Retirement from employment not necessary if new job is
workers. System of Saving for  with different employer and after 6 month waiting period.
Retirement (SAR): Employee: voluntary,  SAR: Age 65, eligible for social security pension or upon
Employer: 2% of payroll. Additional 5%  receipt of employer provided pension.  Unemployed may
up to 10 times of minimum wage to help  withdraw upto 10% of savings, other specific withdrawals
finance housing. Government: none.  permitted. Disability:
50% reduction in usual earnings capacity. 150 weeks of
contribution.  Survivor: Deceased was pensioner or had  150
weeks of contribution at death. For funeral grant:  12 weeks
of contribution in last 9 months or pensioner at death.49
Table A2: OLD AGE, DISABILIry AND  DEATH PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
United  Insured  person:  6.2% of earnings, Self  Old ae  65 (62-64  with reduction);gradually  increasing to
States  employed:  12.4%;  Employer  6.2%  of  67 over  2000-27. Insured:  40  quarters  of coverage  (QC).
payroll; Government:  Cost  of special  Pension  reduced  for high earnings depending  on age and
monthly  old-age  benefits  for persons  earnings. Disability  pension: (disabled  at least
aged  72 before 1968;  whole  cost of  1year):insured:  1 QC for each year since  age 21, upto year
means  tested  allowance. Maximum  disability  began; maximum  40 Qcs. Also  20 QC in 10  year
earnings for contribution  and benefit  period  before  disability  began. More  liberal requirement  for
purposes  established.  young  and blind. Survivor  pension : Deceased  was
pensioner  or had 1 QC for each year since  age 21 and
before  the year of death;  maximum  40 Qcs. Reduced
requirements  for orphans  and non-age  widow  with eligible
lorphan.50
Table  A2:  OLD AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Benefits  Administrative  Organization
Indonesia  Total employee and employer contributions  Ministry of Manpower-- general supervision.  Public
paid in, plus accrued interest  Corporation for Employees Social Security-
administration and operation of program
Malaysia  Old A e:  contribution defined lump sum.  Ministries of Finance and Human Resources, general
Employee entitled to 1/3 of benefit at age 50  supervision.  Social Security Organization  and
without retirement, receives remainder at age  Employees Provident Fund -- administration of
55. Housing withdrawals specified &  program; managed by tripartite governing board.
permitted. Permanent Disabilitv: Pension-50%
of earnings plus 1% for each 12 months of
contribution over 24 months.  Maximum (65%
earnings) and minimum pensions (M$171.43
per month) are established. Maximum
earnings M$2000 a month for disability
benefit purposes.  Disability  Provident Fund-
contribution defined lump sum  if ineligible for
pension and permanently incapacitated.
Survivor pension- percent of actual or
potential disability pension  of the deceased
depending on who survives upto maximum of
100%. provident fund contribution defined
lumpsum payable to nominated survivors or
legal heirs.  Contribution defined death
_benefit.  Funeral grant is MS1000.
Korea  Old Age: 2.4 times the sum of average  National Pension Corporation,  under supervision of
monthly earnings of all insured persons in  Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
previous year and the average monthly
earnings of retiree over entire contribution
period.  For each insured year more than 20,
the monthly benefit amount is increased by
5%.  Permanent Disabilitv: Total disability--
same as old age calculation.  Partial disability-
-reduced by upto 40%.  Survivor: percent of
pension, varying with years of contribution.
Chile (new  Old-age: Contribution defined benefits.  Superintendent of Pension Fund Management
system,  Minimum pension (85% of minimum wage)  Companies-- general supervision; individual pension
1980,81)  guaranteed by government.  At retirement  fund management companies-- administration  of
insured may make withdrawals from account,  individual capitalization accounts.
regulated to guarantee income for expected
life-span or buy annuity from private insurance
company or a combination of the two.
Disabilitv: same as old age pension, minimum
pension guaranteed by Government.  Survivor:
percent of pension varying with conditions of
_survivor(s)  (widow/orphan etc.).51
Table  A2:  OLD AGE, DISABILITY  AND  DEATH PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Mexico  Old age (new  formula):Benefit  amount  based  Ministry  of Labor  and Social  Welfare--  general
on multiples  of minimum  wage in the Federal  supervision.  Mexican  Social  Insurance  Institute--
District (I to 6 times minimum  program  administration  through regional  and local
wage);increases  by 25% of minimum  wage  boards  in areas  which coverage  extended.  Managed  by
with average  earnings  and length  of coverage. General  Assembly,  Technical Council,  Oversight
SAR:  contributions  made to a special  account  Commission,  & Director-General.  SAR:  Mexican
for the employee.  Investment  must yield at  Social  Security  Institute,  program  administered
least 2% real return after commission  and  through SAR  Technical  Community
charges. Benefit  may be paid as a lump  sum
or used to purchase  annuity.  Disabilitv:  same
as old age pension including  for the SAR
SivYor:prcent  of pension  varying  with
condition  of survivor  (s). SAR:  same  as for old
age pension.  Maximum  and minimum
survivor  pensions  are defined.  Funeral  grant is
two months minimum  wage in Federal
District. Christmas  bonus: one  month pension.
United  Old  aze:  Based  on covered  earnings  averaged Department  of Health  & Human  Services--  general
States  over  period  after 1950  (or age 21, if later) upto supervision.  Social  Security  Administration--  in
age 62 or death  excluding  the 5 years of lowest Department  administration  of program  through
earnings.  Available  at age 62, but reduced  for  regional  program  centers,  district  offices,  and branch
each month of receipt  prior to 62. No minimu offices.  Treasury  Department--  collection  of Social
benefit  for workers  reaching  age 62 after 1981.  Security  taxes  through Internal Revenue  Service,
Monthly  maximum  for workers  retiring  at age  payment  of benefits  and management  of funds
65 in 1993. Increment  for each month that
worker  delays  retirement  at ages  65-69;
amount  depends  on when  worker  reached  age
62. Automatic  cost of living  adjustment  and
dependents'  allowances  are defined.
Maximuw.  family  pensions  are defined. A
means-tested  allowance  is payable  to needy
under separate  Supplemental  Security  Income
(SSI)  program. Disabilitv  pension:  similar  to
old-age  pension.  Survivor  pension:  Percent  of
pension depending  on age and conditions  of
survivors.  Means tested  allowance  payable
under Federal-State program to needy orphans.52
Table A4:  WORK INJURY PROGRAMS
Type of System  Coverage  Source of Funds
Indonesia  Social Insurance Program  Social insurance program:  Insured person: None.  Employer:
Establishments with 10 or more  0.24% to 1.74% of payroll,
employees or a payroll of more  according to risk in industry.
than  I million Rupiah.  Coverage  Government: none.
being extended gradually to
smaller establishments.
Voluntary coverage available.
Malaysia  Social Insurance System  Employees earning less than  Insured person: none.  Employer:
M$2,000 a month (or when first  1.25% of payroll according to 24
covered,  or voluntary  agreement  wage classes. Government:  none.
by employer and employee), self-
employed,  casual  workers  and
domestic servants.  .
Korea  Compulsory  insurance  Employees  of industrial  firms  Insured  person: none. Employer:
with public  carrier.  with 5 or more  workers.  0.5% to 3  3.5%  of payroll,
according  to risk in industry
(average 2.21%). Government:
costs of administration.
Chile  Social  Insurance  System.  Employed  persons,  government  Insurance  person: none except  if
workers,  students,  and some self-  self-employed.  Employer:  0.9%
employed  persons.  of payroll,  plus 3.4/-6.8% of
payroll  according  to industry  and
risk (for  wage earners  and salaried
employees).  Employers  may
contract out of system  by offering
equal or improved  benefits.
Government:  none for private
__________  ________________________  sector.
Mexico  Social  Insurance  System  See old age pension.  Insured  person:  none. Employer:
0.875 to 8.75%  of payroll,
according  to risk; average rate
4.42% of payroll. Government:
none. Maximum  and minimum
earnings are established  for
contribution  and benefits
purposes. Special system  of rates
and benefits for self-employed.
United  Compulsory  (elective  in 3  Employees  in industry  and  Insured  person: Nominal
States  states) insurance  through  commerce  generally,  and most  contributions  in few states.
public  or private  carrier  public  employees.  Exclusions:  Employer:  whole  cost in most
(according  to state)  or self-  agricultural  employees  (1/5th  states and most of cost in others,
insurance.  states);  domestics  (1/2  states);  through  either insurance
casual  employees  (3/5  premiums  varying  with risk or
states);employees  of firms with  self-insurance. Average  cost in
fewer  than 3-5 employees  (1/6  1991  about 2.4%  of payroll. Costs
states). Coverage  compulsory  of pneumoconiosis  benefits  for
except  in 3 states.  persons  coming  on rolls after
1973.  Government:  none. Whole
costs  of pneumoconiosis  benefits
for persons on rolls before 1974.53
Table A4:  WORK  INJURY PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Qualifying  Benefits  Administrative Organization
Conditions
Indonesia  Partial or total  Temporary  Disability  benefits: 100%  of  Minister  of Manpower-  general supervision.
disablement  earnings  for first 4 months,  50%  after.  Public  Corporation  for Employees  Social
before  age 55.  Permanent  Disabilitv:  varies  with disability  Security- administration  and operation  of
No minimum  degree. Maximum  70% of previous  monthly  program.
qualifying  period.  earnngs times 60. Death:  funeral  costs  plus
cash  benefiL Workers  medical  benefits:
medical  treatment,  hospital  care,  medicines,
100,000-200,000  Rupiah  for  transportation,
medical  costs  up to 3 million  Rupiah.
Malaysia  No mimimum  Temporarv  Disability:  80% of earnings.  Ministry  of Human  Resources- general
qualifying  period.  Daily  minimum. Permanent  Disabilitv  supervision.  Social  Security  Organization-
pension:  90% of earnings  if total disability.  administration  of work-injury  program;
Daily  minimum. Constant  attendance  managed  by tripartite  governing  board.
supplied  up to maximum. Partial  disability:
proportion  of full  pension  with degree  of
disability. Workers  Medical: medical
treatment,  hospitalization,  medicines
(government  hospital  and contracted
doctors). Survivor:  pension  and funeral
costs.
Korea  No minimum  Temporary  Disabilitv;  70% of average  Ministry  of Labor  Affairs- general
qualifying  period.  earnings  up to 24 months. Permanent  supervision.
disability: Total  disability-  annual  pension
equal  to 138-329  days  average  earnings.
Partial  disability-  lump  sum  equal  to 55-
1,474  days earnings  according  to degree  of
disability. Workers  Medical:  free  treatment,
surgery,  hospitalization,  medicines,  etc.
transportation,  rehabilitation.  Survivor:
lump  sum equal  to 1300  days average
eaniungs  payable  to surviving  family  plus
pension  defined  as percent  of annual
earnings  according  to number  of people.
Funeral  grant:  120  days average  earnings.
Chile  No minimum  Temnorarg  Disability:  same  as under  cash  Ministry  of Labor  and Social  Welfare-
qualifying  period.  sickness  benefit  (up to 52 weeks,  may  general  supervision.  Administration  of
extend  to 104  weeks). Permanent  disabilitv  contributions  and cash.  benefits  through
pension:  total-70%  of base wage.  Constant  Social  Insurance  Service,  Private Salaried
attendantance  suppliment.  Partial:  35%  Employees'  Welfare  Fund, and other social
base wage. Lump  sum grant  up to 15  security  funds,  and employers'  non  profit
months  base wage  for less disability.  mutual  insurance  group. National  Health
Workers  medical:  medicine,  rehabilitation,  Service- provision  of medical  benefits.
occupational  training. Survivor:  percent  of
pension  depending  on survivor.  Funeral
grant  is 3 times monthly  minimum  wage.54
Table A4:  WORK  INJURY  PROGRAMS
(Cont'd)
Mexico  No minimum  Temporn  v  Disability:  100%  of average  Ministry  of Labor  and Social  Welfare-
qualifyfing  period.  earnings  up to maximum. Permanent  general  supervision.  Mexican  Social
disability:  pension-70% of earnings.  Insurance  Institution- administration  of
Christmas  bonus:  I month's pension.  contributions  and benefits  through  regional
Adjusted  with minimum  wage. Partial  and local boards.
disability:  percent of pension  varying  with
amount  of disability. Workers  medical:  full
medical,  surgical,  hospital,  medicines,  etc.
Christmas  bonus: I month's pension.
Survivor  pension:  percent  of total disability
pension  of insured upto I  00% depending  on
survivor.  Christmas  bonus:  I month's
pension.  Minimum  pension  is same  as old
age  pension.  Funeral  grant:  two  months
minimum  wage;  pension  adjusted  in
proportion  to minimumn  wage  in Federal
District
United  No rminimum  Temporary  Disability:  2/3 of earnings  in  Program  administered  by State worker's
States  qualifying  period.  most states. Maximum  benefit  according  to  compensation  agencies,  in about 1/2  of
state; Payable  if injury  lasts 3 days -6  states;  State Departments  of Labor  in about
weeks.  Additional  variation  in benefits  with  3/8;  courts  in 3 States;  pneumoconiosis:
state. Permanent  disability:  total-2/3  of  federal  government  and state.  1/3  States
earnings  in most states.  Defined  monthly  have government  workers' compensation
benefit  for pneumoconiosis.  Maximum  fund;  Employers  must insure with State
weekly  pension  according  to state.  Payable  Fund  in 6 States; may insure with State or
for life or throughout  disability  in 4/5 of the  private  carrier in 14 States;  and may insure
states. Partial  disability-  proportional  to  with private  carrier  in remainder.  Most
loss. Worker's  medical  :care provided  as  States allow  self-insurance.
long  as required  in all states.  Survivor
Benefits:  pension-percent  of earnings
depending  on who survives.  Defined  benefits
for pneumoconiosis.  Maximum  pension
defined.  Lumpsum  funeral  grant  according  to
State.55
Table  A5:  LABOR STANDARDS  FOR WORKING CONDITIONS
_Hours  of Work  Rest Penod  Overtime
Indonesia  Maximum  7 hours a day or 40  At least 1/2 hour rest after 4  1.5  times wages  per hour for
hours a week. May be extended  successive  hours of work. 1 day  the first overtime  hour. Twice
to 9 hours a day,  54 hours a  rest a week. May also  change  wage per hour for every
week  with overtime  pay.  to 2 rest  days a week  under 8  overtime  work of the following
hour workdays  with agreement  days. Separate  rates for
from workers.  holidays. Pregnant and young
workers  may not be hired
overtime.
Malaysia  No worker  should  work more  At least 1/2 hour rest after 5  Work on rest day: if work is for
than 8 hours a day, in excess  of  consecutive  hours. If 8  less than 1/2 normal hours, 1
a spread  over  period  of 10  hours  continuous  hours required,  days  wage at ordinary  rate; if
per day, more  than 48 hours  must get at least  45 minutes  for  work  is more than 1/2  but less
per week. By mutual  meals  and recreation. At least  than I full day's normal hours,
agreement  can increase to 9  one  day rest per week.  2 days  wages  at normal rate.
hours a day up to 48 hours per  For monthly  salaried workers
week maximum. Law  rates of pay are 1/2  and full
stipulates  maximums  for piece  days pay respectively.  Rates are
rate, etc. (12 hours per day).  3 times  a days  pay for longer
hours and  twice for holiday
Korea  Maximum  8 hours a day,  44  Not  less  than 1/2 hour for every  More  than 1.5  times normal
hours a week  excluding  rest  4 hours and not less than 1 hour  wage  for overtime  work, night
period. May be extended  up to  for  every 8 hours during the  work  and holiday  work.
maximum  12  hours a week  with  course  of work. Exclusions  for
mutual  agreement. Ministry  of  hours per day and rest hours
Labor approval  needed  and may  with approval  from Ministry  of
order rest period/day-off  Labor. One or more  days  off in
corresponding  to extensions.  the week. I day  leave per
month with pay.
Chile  Maximum  48 hours  per week,  At least 1  day a week.  50% surcharge  for overtime.
spread  out over 5 or 6 days,
maximum  overtime  2 hours  per
day.
Mexico  Maximum  8 hours a day,  48  At least one half hour per shift  Must  be paid at twice  the hourly
hours per week, 5 1/2 days  or  (day/night/mixed).  One  salary, including  holidays.
any other arrangement. 40  complete  day  of rest per week.  Overtime  must be less than 3
hours is more common.  hours  per day and cannot  be
performed  in more  than 3
consecutive  days. Overtime
beyond  9 hours per week  must
be paid at 3 times the hourly
rate.
United  No maximum  hours in Federal  No mandates  in Federal  Law  Federal  law requires  that
States  law.  employers  must pay employees
not less  than 1.5  times regular
rate for all hours worked  in
excess of 40 hours a week.56
Table A5:  LABOR  STANDARDS  FOR  WORKING  CONDITIONS
(Cont'd)
Annual Leave  with Pay  Minimum Age of Employment  Menstrual Leave
Indonesia  2 weeks,  calculated  as I day  for  15  years. Conditions  under  Fenale employees  shall  not  be
every 22 days up to maximum  which younger  children  may  obliged  to work  on first and
12 days a year. After 6 years in  work specified  in law.  second  day of menstrual  period.
same organization,  entitled  to 3
months.
Malaysia  8 days  for every 12 months  of  Part X, "Employment  of  None.
continuous  service  with same  Children  and Young  Persons",
employer,  if employed  less  than  of Employment  Act 265 has
2 years; 12 days  if 2-5 years; 16  been  repealed.
days if more  than 5 years. If
worked  less  than I year,
computed  proportionately  to
completed  months  in service.
Not  eligible  for leave if absent
without  leave for more  than
10%  of working days.
Korea  10 days  leave with  pay for one  Minor  under 13  years shall not  One day leave  with pay for
full year service  without  be employed  except  with  menstruation  every month.
absence; 8 days if not less than  employment  certificate  from
90% attendance  of one  year's  Minister  of Labor.
service. For workers  with
continuous service  of at least  2
years, I day  for each
consecutive  year. But may pay
wage instead of allowing  leave
_________  over 20 days.  _
Chile  15  business  days per year,  with  18  and above  may  be hired.  None.
an increase  of one business  day  Hiring  of 14-18  with  special
for every  3 years after 10  years  permission  and protection  with
of service.  regard  to timetables,  workdays,
and type  of work  performed.
Below 14 may not be hired.
Mexico  6 vacation  days after one  year  Not available  None.
employment,  2 more  days  for
each additional  year, up to 12
days. From 5h year  of
employment,  14 workdays'
vacation;  every 5 years,  2 more
days. Employers  must pay
vacation  premium  of 25% of
salary earned during  vacation
days; must be taken within 6
months and when suitable  to
employer.
United  No mandates  in Federal  Law.  Minors  under age 14 are under  None.
States  the legal age for employment,
.________  ._______________________  newspaper delivery exempted.57
Table AS:  LABOR  STANDARDS  FOR  WORKING  CONDITIONS
(Cont'd)
Maternity  Leave  Bonus/Profit  Sharing
Indonesia  3 months.  1.5 months before and  1.5 after.  New ministerial decree (Sept. 1994) requires all
Maximum extension of 3 months before expected  companies to pay 13th month salary timed with
date with medical certificate  religious holiday.  This used to be strongly
recommended previously, will now be
compulsory.  Includes basic salary and fixed
allowances.
Malaysia  60 consecutive days and employer must pay a  None.
maternity allowance for this period.  Maternity
leave shall not begin earlier than a period of 30
days immediately before,  nor later than day
following confinement.  No maternity allowance
if at least 5 surviving children.
Korea  60 days leave with pay.  But more than 30 days  None.
shall be reserved for use after childbirth.
Chile  6 weeks before delivery and 12 weeks after  None.
childbirth, with a state subsidy. Leave also
available with state subsidy to care for sick child
under  12 months (transferable to father).
Mexico  Not Available  Christmas bonus at least 15 days salary
considered part of the salary and must be paid
before December 20.  Employees must receive
share of  enterprise profits  as determined by
National Committee for Employees' Profit
Sharing in Enterprise.  Currently 10% of pre-tax
income, some exclusions.
United  Not Available  None.
States58
Table A6:  UNION REGISTRATION,  EXTENT OF SECURITY, ALLOCATION  OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAII%UNG  RIGHTS
Regulations on Formation of Legal  Property Rights to Represent Workers in
Unions  Collective Bargaining
Indonesia  A trade union at any level must be  Unions must be registered to enter into
registered at the Ministry of Labor.  binding contracts at any level.  Collective
Registration of a federation requires  labor agreements  by  "independent"
representation in a minimum number of  unions beyond plant level are still
provinces, regions, factory and minimum  effectively not possible in law.
membership in each factory unit.  A new
law permits establishment of independent
plant unions.
Malaysia  Registration is required to have rights and  A union must be registered and also
activities of a union.  Employer must  recognized by the employer by established
recognize the union.  Registrar has powers  procedure, as the proper body to represent
to refuse or revoke registration under  the class of workers who form its
certain circumstances.  Minister of Labor  membership.  Members of a union must be
has extensive powers and may suspend  of a similar trade or industry or within a
unions for security.  single enterprise.
Korea  Workers may organize or join a trade union  The representative of a trade union or those
at liberty. Enterprises must establish a  who are duly authorized by the trade union
labor-management council to decide  can negotiate a collective agreement.  Unit
working conditions.  trade unions may entrust the federation of
unions to which it is affiliated with the
____________  power to negotiate.
Chile  Registration of Trade Unions does not  Workers affiliate to enterprise level unions.
require prior authorization at all levels.  Two or more enterprise level unions may
Law establishes minimum size and/or  coexist, unions may affiliate with others,
representation rules for unions depending  but collective bargaining beyond the firm
on size of unit.  Unions may affiliate with  level requires voluntary cooperation of
others; trade unions with confederations,  employers.
federations, centrals.
Mexico  Law guarantees freedom of association.  Only a trade union (not a coalition) may
Previous authorization is not required for  sign a collective agreement on behalf of
establishment of a labor union which can  workers.  Unions can be craft, enterprise
be established with at least 20 workers in  unions, industrial unions, rational
active service.  industry-wide unions, multi-craft unions.
Union must represent majority workers in
an enterprise/ establishment.
United  Employees have right to form, join, or  Unit of employees must be appropriate for
States  assist labor organizations.  Unions must be  collective bargaining,  i.e., employees must
selected by a majority of workers in the  have substantially similar interests
bargaining unit.  Employer recognition of  regarding wages, hours, working
the union as the exclusive bargaining  conditions.  Bargaining unit may cover
representative can be settled by elections  employees in one or more plants of the
conducted by National Labor Relations  employer; apropriateness is determined by
Board (NLRB).  NLRB by case.59
Table A6:  UNION REGISTRATION,  EXTENT OF SECURITY,  ALLOCATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RIGHTS  (Cont'd)
Application  of Collective
Extent of Union Security  Contract  Union  Dues
Indonesia  Termination of employment on  Manpower Ministry could require  Member contribution is as
the basis  of establishment  or  that  the employer  extend  determined  by the Federation  of
union membership is not  negotiated benefits to the non-  Trade Unions and should be
permitted.  No specific reference  union employees in  consistent with the constitution
to union security.  establishment.  Ministry can also  and internal rules of the union.
decide that part or all of a  Automatic check-off is routed
collective labor agreement can be  through Manpower Ministry.
applied to other employers/  The law is unclear on collection
employees in same field of  from non-members who benefit.
activity.
Malaysia  Laws guarantee freedom of  Collective agreement applies to  As laid down in the rules and
affiliation and disaffiliation;  all members employed at the time  constitution of the trade union.
discrimination on the basis of  or subsequently in the enterprise  Decisions on the imposition of a
union status is forbidden. No  to which the agreement relates.  levy, like other rules, are arrived
specific reference to union  at through a mandatory secret
security.  ballot.
Korea  Employment discrimination on  A collective labor agreement  Members must pay membership
the basis of union status is  (CLA) that applies to majority of  dues every month (less than two
forbidden. Laws guarantee  workers in an enterprise, will  percent of the wage thereof).
freedom of affiliation and non-  apply to all workers there.  If
affiliation.  Union shops are  two-thirds of workers of the same
permitted if negotiated in  kind in a region are under a
collective agreements.  CLA, at request of one or both
parties of a CLA or ex officio,
the Labor Relations Commission
may apply it to all similar
workers in the area. A public
announcement of such a decision
___________  must be made without delay.
Chile  Laws guarantee freedom of  Employer may apply the benefits  Unions are funded by voluntary
affiliation and disaffiliation;  stipulated by collective contracts  contributions of members as
discrimination and conditioning  to workers occupying  similar  determined by the union.  Union
employment on the basis of union  positions or functions as the  fees are determined by union
status is forbidden (i.e., closed  workers on the contract. In that  statutes and must be approved by
and unions shops are illegal).  case, non-members may be  absolute majority, secret voting.
There is emphasis on freedom of  required to pay up to 75% of the  Non-members may be required to
disaffiliation and an agency shop  normal contribution.  pay up to 75% of the normal
provision.  contribution if they benefit from a
CLA.
Mexico  Law states that "no one may be  The provisions of a CLA cover all  Through member contributions.
forced to join or not join a  the employees of the enterprise or
union".  Yet, a collective  establishment even if they are not
bargaining agreement may  members of the union.  It may
contain a "closed shop"  exclude employees in positions of
provision as long as workers  trust whose contracts must
employed prior to the agreement  however not be inferior.
who are non-members of the
union are not "prejudiced".
United States  Closed shops are illegal.  Union  A collective contract applies to  Unions are funded through dues,
shops are pernitted in inter-state  all workers in a bargaining unit  fees and assessments which are
trade but they function more as  irrespective of membership  voted upon by members.
agency shops due to law.  States  status.
can enact their own laws for
intra-state trade and can prohibit
union security. 20 states
.______  prohibited union security in 1987.
Source:  Republic of Indonesia, 1988, 1992; Encyclopedia  of Labor Law 1994; Republic of Korea, 1991; Secretaria de
trabajo.... 1992; unpublished document from Embassy of Chile, 1993; Taylor and Witney, 1987.60
Table A7:  DISPUTE  RESOLUTIoN  AND  THE  RIGHT  TO  STRE
Procedure  for  Resolving  Suspension  or Replacement  of
Disputes  arising  in  The  Right  to Strike  Striking  Workers
Collective  Negotiations
Indonesia  Settlement  of an industrial  Workers  may strike  only  if  The  law  is not  specific.  But  works
relations  dispute  must go  negotiations  with  the official  may  be fired  if don't show  up for
through  stages  including  fail or the employer  refuses  to  work  for  6 consecutive  days.
bipartite  negotiations,  negotiate.  Workers  must
mediation  by a Ministry  of  notify  the employer  and the
Labor  (MOL)  official  and  Chair  of the Regional
settlement  by regional  and  Committee  of their intention  to
central  committees.  Central  strike  and may  only  strike  after
committee  decisions  are  the Chair  has acknowledged
binding  unless  nullified  by  the receipt  of the notification
the Labor  Minister.  (which  should  be done in 7
days). A strike  must  be
suspended  if there is an
inquuy.
Malaysia  If  direct  negotiations  fail,  Yes,  if the strike  is called  by  a  Workers  who  have  gone  on  strike
conciliation  by official  of  requested  Trade  Union  on  lawfully  cannot  be disniied  on
Ministry  (or as decided  by the  behalf  of its members.  grounds  that they have  been  absent
Director  General,  Industrial  Sympathy/  political  strikes  are  from  work  without  reasonable  eKuse.
Relations)  may  be requested.  illegal. The  decision  must  be  for  more  than  2 consecutive  days  as
The  Minister  is provided  with  voted  on by secret  ballot,  provided  in Employment  Act
the overriding  power  to  receive  2/3 majority  and the
contain  disputes  through  the  results  communicated  to
power  to intervene.  The  Registrar  in 14 days. A strike
Minister  may  impose  can  only  be called  7 days  later.
compulsory  arbitration  It is illegal  to strike  if there  is
through  independent  court  or  an mquiry/  investigation  or if
call investigation/inquiry.  the matter  is with  the
Industrial  Court.
Korea  If independent  negotiations  The  majority  of the union  must  The law is not  specific.
fail, then  upon  notice  of the  cast  an affirmative  vote  on the
dispute,  the Labor  Relations  decision  to strike. Notice  of
Conmmission  (LRC)  appoints  the labor  dispute  to
conciliation  by a conciliation  Administrative  Authority  and
commission.  If it fails,  the  to the LRC  must be made  and
LRC  undertakes  mediation  a strike  can  only  take  place 10
through  a mediation  days  later. The  Administrative
commission.  Voluntary  Authority  (MOL/mayors/
conciliation,  mediation  or  Provincial  Governor)  may
arbitration  may  be chosen.  suspend  a strike  with  approval
The  MOL  may  decide  if there  from  LRC  under  certain
is need  for  emergency  circumstances.
adjustmnent  in which  case  the
"dispute"  is suspended  and
the Central  LRC  may  decide
on  arbitration.
Chile  Apart  from  self-settlement,  If  no agreement  is reached  and  Substitute  woraers  may  be hied or
voluntary  mediation  or  the contract  term expires  or  striking  workers  may  be allowed  to
arbitration  may  be chosen,  more  than  40 days  after  a draft  work  under  the same  tams a  prior
Mediation  may  only  last 10  collective  contract  has been  to the strilke  (but ajuted  and
days  after the appointment  of  submitted,  the workers'  adjustable  by  CPI).  The  employment
a mediator.  If no agreement  Bargaiing Committee  may  contract  is suspended,  workers  are
is reached,  the  mediator  calls  call a vote  to accept  the  not  obliged  to work,  cmployars e
a hearing  where  last proposals  employer's  last  offer  or to  not  obliged  to pay  wages,  but
are submitted  and the  strike. A strike is effective  on  workers  may  continue  to contribute
mediator  must  present  a  the third  working  day after  to social  security.
proposal  and parties  must  approval  if more  than 50%  of
reply  in 3 days.  workers  in enterprise  stop
work.  ._.61
Table  A7:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION  AND  THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
(Cont'd)
Mexico  Labor  disputes  can be  Partial strikes  are not allowed  For  legal strikes  all employment
resolved  by direct  settlement,  within  contracts  are suspended  and even
conciliation,  mediation,  establishment/enterprise.  temporary  replacement  workers
arbitration,  or by settlement  Solidarity  and "justified"  cannot  be hired. If it is a "justified"
by Courts. A hearing  must be  strikes  are pernutted.  stnke, the employer  must meet the
held at conciliation  and  Notification  of the intention  to  workers' demands  plus pay wages  for
arbitration  board  to seek  strike must be given  at least 6  lost days. Workers  do not have the
settlement  of a proposed  days before. The  union  must  right  to wage compensation  in
strike. Within  72 hours of a  file the petition  with  the  sympathy  strikes. If the strike is
strike its legal status  may be  Council  and Arbitration  Board,  determined  to be illegal,  workers
requested from  the board.  addressed  to the employer,  must return  to work  in 24 hours.
.who  must respond in 48 hours.
United  Voluntary  mediation,  Yes. Strikes  in violation  of no-  Employer  may hire replacement
States  conciliation  and arbitration  strike clause  in CBA  illegal.  workers. In case of ULP strike,
available. While parties  are  Legal  strikes  may be "Unfair  employer  must rehire the returning
not required  to use the  Labor  Practice"  or  strikers  even if replacement  workers
Federal  Mediation  and  "Economic"  strikes. No  are displaced. In an economic  strike,
Conciliation  Service  (FMCS),  notification  of a proposed  the employer  is not required  to
neutral  conciliation  is  strike  is required  but  displace  replacement  workers  but
available  through  it and its  notification  before  terminatiord  must put returning  strikers on
decision  are not binding.  modification  of contract  is  preferred  list for future vacancies.
required  to FMCS  which  is
used to assign  mediators  to
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